

JPRS-EER-86-170

7 NOVEMBER 1986

East Europe Report

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ECONOMY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HARVEST RESULTS FOR 1986 PUBLISHED

Potato, Corn, Hops Harvest

AU220525 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 17 Sep 86 p 2

[Summary] Potatoes have been harvested from 32,600 hectares so far, which is 24.7 percent of the area of cultivation. Because of drought in the crucial period of growth, the potatoes are small in size and the harvest will fall short of the plan. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, the need for potatoes for human consumption will be "fully covered," however. The harvest of corn grown for silage is also in full swing. It has been harvested from 142,000 hectares, which is 34 percent of the statewide area. The harvest of hops, which was affected by adverse weather, has already ended. Only 80 percent of the production plan will be fulfilled but the quality of the crop is better than last year. Exports to socialist and nonsocialist countries will be fulfilled and the needs of domestic breweries will also be fully met. The production of flax will also fall short of the plan. Because of sufficient stocks, this shortfall will have no impact on the textile industry. On the contrary, because of the excellent quality of this year's flax, it will be possible to do without the Kc\$15 million worth of annual imports of high quality flax.

Harvest Estimates

AU220521 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 86 p 3

[Summary] Pre-hectare yields of grain crops in the Czech Socialist Republic are estimated to average 4.25 metric tons this year, which is below the planned 4.46 metric tons. According to preliminary estimates, the average yields of the two other major crops will also fall short of the plan. The latest estimates anticipate 20.37 metric tons of potatoes from each hectare (compared with planned 21.5 metric tons) and 37.73 metric tons of sugar beets (compared with planned 40.5 metric tons).

Grain Harvest Estimate

AU220524 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 86 p 1

[Summary] About 25,000 hectares of grain crops, 1.6 percent of total area, remained to be harvested in the Czech Socialist Republic on 9 September, most

of them in mountainous areas where the grain is not yet ripe. It is estimated that the total harvest of wheat, barley, rye, and oats will fall more than 300,000 metric tons short of the plan. To reduce this shortfall, the harvest commission attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Czech Socialist Republic stressed the need to select suitable plots of corn grown for silage, wait for it to get ripe, and reap its grain.

South Moravia Harvest Result

AU220520 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 86 p 4

[Summary] According to M. Zajic, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ South Moravia Regional Committee, the region harvested 1.582 million metric tons of grain crops from 353,700 hectares this year, which is a pre-hectare average of 4.5 metric tons. The region thus fell about 180,000 metric tons short of the plan. An Zajic stated, shortcomings of a subjective nature are accountable for at least 50 percent of the shortfall, that is, for about 90,000 metric tons worth Kcs140 million.

Field Work Progress

AU070535 Prague ZEMEDELSKI NOVINY in Czech 1 Oct 86 p 4

[Summary] By 29 September in corn for silage was gathered on 62.8 percent of the planted area, potatoes on 63.5 percent, and flax on 75.2 percent. Winter cereals were sown on 49.4 percent of the planned area.

Sugar Beet Harvest

AU070535 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Oct 86 p 1

[Summary] Toward the end of September the sugar content of sugar beets were 0.07 percent higher than in 1985. Deplorably, sugar beets in the Czech SR are being harvested from less than 140,000 hectares, which is over 6,000 hectares less than in 1985.

National Economy Discussed

AU070353 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Sep 86 p 2

[Summary] The National Economic Commission of the CPCZ Central Committee held a meeting in Prague on 22 September. The meeting was presided over by commission chairman Milos Jakes, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee. The participants in the meeting, "in an extensive and matter-of-fact discussion, assessed the Program of the Realization of Further Measures in the System of Planned Management of the National Economy in the Eighth 5-Year Plan and of the Orientation of Longer-term Work Toward Perfecting Management."

Worrying Fuel Situation

AU070353 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Oct 86 p 2

[Summary] Prague (CTK)--The enormous increase in the consumption of electric power by small consumers, social organizations, and citizens in the past month is worrying the power engineers. This forces the steam power plants to step up their production, even though the nuclear power plants are working reliably and to their maximum capacity. The fuel extraction plan for this year will have to be overfulfilled in view of this situation, since the steam power plants must be supplied with fuel. The stocks of bituminous coal in the Detmarovice electric power plant in North Moravia have been greatly depleted, and other traditional power plants will need about 2.5-3.0 million tons more than planned of brown coal for energy generation.

Peat Reserves

AU160500 Prague PRACE in Czech 14 Oct 86 p 2

[Summary] Most peat deposits in the CSSR are found near Sobeslav, Lany, and Krasno in the Sokolov District, and between Pernik and Abertany near Karlovy Vary in the Ore Mountains District. The CSSR has a total of 2,500 peat deposits 4-8 meters deep, and mostly not larger than 13 hectares. The total acreage amounts to almost 32,000 hectares and contains an estimated 50 million cubic meters of peat. About 17 percent of the deposits belong to national parks, 5 percent are used for medical purposes, and four-fifths are suitable for industrial use in agriculture, forestry, fruit cultivation, and gardening and for recultivating soil after surface coal extraction. Currently, 170,000 tons of peat are utilized for these purposes and 40,000 tons are made into fertilizers in mixture with city garbage.

Shortcomings in Sugar Production

AU160500 Bratislava VECERNIK in Slovak 13 Oct 86 p 1

[Summary] Prague (C)--Sugar beet cultivation and sugar production are currently among the weakest links in the CSSR's plant production, although the sowing acreage has been almost stabilized and labor productivity strikingly increased. The equipment of the sugar industry with regard to facilities and technology is insufficient and represents a serious obstacle to the efficient utilization of sugar beet.

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CSO: 2400/27

ECONOMY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

MINING IN NORTH BOHEMIA--The North Bohemian brown coal basin, the largest in the country, exceeded the coal production plan by 1.3 million metric tons in the first 8 months of the year. The planned removal of overburden was exceeded by 4.5 million cubic meters. In the entire 1986-90 period, miners in North Bohemia should produce more than 348 million metric tons of coal, compared with 347 million metric tons in 1981-85. [Summary] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 10 Sep 86 p 2] /9604

AUTOMOTIVE CONTRACT WITH USSR--At the International Engineering Trade Fair in Brno the Czechoslovak foreign trade corporation, Strojexport, signed a contract today with the Soviet foreign trade organization, Avtopromimport, under which the CSSR is to deliver complete warehouses, including internal equipment, to the Volga Motor Car Works in Toliatti in the 1987-1990 period worth KCS600 million. This includes shelves, lines for receiving and dispatching goods, and other equipment. The stores will be built in selected areas of the USSR to supply spare parts to users of the Lada cars. A part of this contract is the delivery of a complete automated warehouse for the Lenin Motor Car Works in Moscow to be equipped moreover with a CSSR-made control system. [Summary] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1000 GMT 21 Sep 86] /9604

PLANT AGREEMENT WITH USSR--Moscow, 24 Sep (CTK correspondent)--A Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on cooperation in the construction of a plant for the treatment of oxidized iron ore in Krivoy Rog, Ukraine, was signed here today. The plant will be constructed by five CMEA member states and Czechoslovakia will build a magnetic separation unit. [Text] [Prague CTK in English 1524 GMT 24 Sep 86] /9604

MACHINE AGREEMENT WITH NICARAGUA--Prague, 24 Sep (CTK)--Czechoslovakia and Nicaragua signed here today a government agreement on the supplies of Czechoslovak machines, equipment and material to Nicaragua. The document was signed by Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Bohumil Urban and Nicaraguan Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Ramon Bayardo Altamirano Lopez. [Text] [Prague CTK in English 1739 GMT 24 Sep 86] /9604

CSO: 2400/25

ECONOMY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

INTERFLUG AERIAL PHOTO OPERATIONS DETAILED

East Berlin FLIEGER REVUE in German No 8, Aug 86 pp 242-246

[Article by engineers K. Apel, S. Sassor and D. Kostial: "Intensification in Flight"]

[Text] A few months ago, as an INTERFLUG Mi-8 helicopter hovering over the roofs of the Berlin city district Prenzlauer Berg made all the passers-by on the street look up, they certainly had no idea that they had just witnessed the application of one of the new procedures required by the directive of the 11th SED Congress, without which it would not be possible to accomplish the immense construction and restoration measures in our capital city, whose volume will increase by 46 percent from 1986 through 1990.

But this time, the Mi-8 was not, as so often before, helping our builders as a flying crane. It had no cable winch on board but cameras and in 55 minutes the crew made 142 aerial photographs and oblique shots of more than 1,800 roofs. They serve as the basis for repair, modernization and reconstruction projects in our capital city's housing construction program. And if one imagines how much time and effort it requires to climb up on 1,800 roofs and inspect, note and measure all damage, whereby this work is not entirely without danger, then one can easily believe that with the aid of the registration of damage from the air as much as 60 percent of the time and more than half of the costs can be saved relative to the roof climbing that has been required heretofore.

But that is just one of the numerous fields of work of the operation remote sensing, industrial and research flights of INTERFLUG, whose fleet of aircraft includes that Mi-8 helicopter hovering over the roofs of Prenzlauer Berg. After all, the application of the multiple possibilities of civilian aviation in the national economy of the GDR has already been normal practice for several decades.

The services of agrarian flight operations in fertilizing and pest control in agriculture and forestry as well as in fruit growing increased steadily and the continuously growing demand of the energy economy, construction and transportation as well as many industrial sectors for helicopter crane and

assembly flights show that important tasks can be performed from the air not only in a timely manner with good quality but also considerably more efficiently than with traditional technologies.

Since the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, INTERFLUG has expanded its spectrum of services for the national economy and science through a new area of operations for its aircraft--remote sensing. It is certainly no less effective for the individual user areas than the agrarian and industrial flight operations.

Today the operation especially created by a decision of the party leadership for remote sensing and research flights has efficient and universally applicable aircraft and helicopters as well as up-to-date photographic equipment.

With its experienced pilots and camera operators, it also has the personnel to carry out the most varied requirements of science, the economy and culture as ordered and on time.

To that end, preferential use is made of the multipurpose aircraft L-410UVP.

As for aerial photogrammetric photographic equipment for vertical shots, they use high-resolution photogrammetric cameras with focal distances of 90, 150 and 300 mm with and without image-motion compensation (photo format 23 cm x 23 cm) as well as the multispectral cameras MKF-6 and MSK-4 (photo format 5.6 cm x 8 cm) from the Carl Zeiss Combine in Jena. Use is also made of efficient oblique-image cameras and video recording equipment. For photos in thermal infrared and geophysical reconnaissance, INTERFLUG cooperates with partners such as the Berlin Energy Combine or the VEB Geophysics in Leipzig.

In what areas and with what kind of intensification effect for the national economy is this up-to-date flight and photographic equipment used?

Above all, surveying is the classical primary field of application of aerial photogrammetry. Geodetic and cartographic displays are thereby derived from the aerial photograph. They represent certain terrain sectors in an established scale. The photographic material forms the basis for the determination of distances, surface features and terrain elevations or building heights with great accuracy. In principle, it is thus possible to determine, for example, the volumes of overburden moved in strip lignite mines in a certain time period. So we are already at one of the main uses of remote sensing, the strip lignite mining of so much importance for our energy economy.

A so-called miner's documentation is necessary as the basis for all work in the operation of a strip mine. It is made up of charts and ground plans in different scales. It represents and registers everything that can be of importance in mining operations. This documentation must be renewed every 6 months. But that alone is not enough. For also necessary is a weekly to monthly charted documentation to record the changes that occur through the on-going working of earth and coal. That is necessary to determine how the mining operations can be carried on most favorably, the track system laid, the

dumps structured without danger of skidding, or large mining equipment used most effectively. Those are only some of a large number of aspects under which such charted documentation must be provided. The use of aerial photographs means an increase in efficiency of 350 percent relative to the classical methods in which in a strip mine alone 20 or more surveyors on the ground had to produce the necessary data with surveyor's rods, measuring instruments and theodolites with an extremely great expenditure of time. And to illustrate the scope of the use of aerial photographs: the weekly flying of the Lausitz and the monthly flying of the Leipzig strip mines corresponds to a flown area equal to 30 percent of the entire territory of the G.D.R. This miner's documentation arising through the aerial surveying of the strip lignite mines and continuously brought up to date is also the basis for the rational demonstration of the weekly or monthly movement of overburden and of the standing safety of the large equipment. Thus, for example, a possible stopping of the aerial photography for three or four coverage periods can even lead to the shutdown of the strip mining because the standing safety of the equipment can no longer be determined precisely. Equally important for securing the production of mines are operational aerial photographs in breakdown situations.

But aerial photography is involved not only in coal mining but afterwards as well, when closed strip mines are recultivated. To reclaim the landscape, one needs ground geological appraisals as the basis for the implementation of such site-specific measures as amelioration, fertilization, etc. And these appraisals can be done most efficiently primarily through multispectral aerial photographs.

But back to the aerial surveying photographs. They are needed in numerous other areas as well. They are the basis for topographic and the derived thematic maps. They serve in the site planning of industrial complexes and housing areas and help in the determination of the routes of transport arteries and power lines, in the development of deposits of raw materials, in the planning of measures for environmental protection and the water supply, in keeping the agricultural land register up to date, and much more. Questions in the selection of the most favorable sites, a smaller additional outlay for registration, and a reduction of development expenditures while making optimum use of local factors are thereby in the foreground.

The surveying aspect of aerial photographs is also in the foreground in the application of remote sensing in construction and territorial planning in city areas. Increasingly important in the GDR at the present time is, for example, the recording of the area and condition of the old buildings in the inner city, especially, as described at the outset, the determination and surveying of roofs suitable for reconstruction.

In past decades, the high rate of development of our national economy led to rapid environmental changes. Every 5 years, therefore, the topographical charts in the scale of 1:10,000 for the entire territory of the GDR must be brought up to the latest status. But that is inseparable from the use of remote sensing, which provides the necessary aerial photographs. It yields a gain of efficiency of 350 percent relative to ground-based cartographic procedures.

In contrast to the tasks just described that are resolved with the help of aerial photogrammetry, the thematic interpretation, as the experts call this evaluation of the aerial photographs, is in the foreground in the application of remote sensing in geology and in geophysical reconnaissance. This can be achieved more easily through the interpretation of characteristic geological structures indicating deposits of raw materials from aerial photographs and electronic visual recordings in the invisible range of the electromagnetic spectrum (thermal radiation and radar) than from the ground. In this way, the ground-based geological reconnaissance of deposits, including, for example, prospecting drilling and the application of other geological reconnaissance methods, is supplemented and made more efficient through remote sensing from the air.

Geophysical reconnaissance itself is made enormously more efficient through the application of remote-sensing methods, for example through the surveying of the magnetic field, through gamma spectrometry, and through the measurement of the diffusion characteristic of electromagnetic waves in the long-wave range from the air. The results are presented as isolines on geographical charts. Because connected areas are thereby covered, statements on the existence of deposits can be made with a high degree of probability.

In agriculture, the application of remote sensing is primarily a matter of the rationalization of site studies in relation to excessive moisture (amelioration projects), soil quality, erosion, weed and pest infestations, and plant protection but it also involves operational stocktaking. From it are derived measures for soil and plant cultivation to compensate for reductions in stocks. The timely operational stocktaking with the help of remote sensing thus has a direct effect on annual profits. In the case of the site studies, on the other hand, the rationalization effect is initially seen mainly in the reduction of the expenditures for coverage and only in the following years in increased profits as well.

In the GDR's forestry, remote sensing now has the main task of undertaking an inventory of standing wood every 10 years. It is thereby necessary to determine both the number of trees and the average trunk diameter for separate age groups.


With the help of aerial photographs in selected representative forest areas, random surveys are carried out to determine the number of trunks per area unit. Through photographs with at least 60 percent overlapping, a stereoscopic assessment is possible, so that the tree heights and thus the trunk diameter can be determined in addition to the tree diameter evident anyway.

In agriculture and forestry, remote sensing fulfills a number of other tasks that cannot be discussed within the scope of this article. But it should be said that in agriculture and forestry and the increasingly important environmental protection alone the remote-sensing crews cover 20 percent of the territory of the GDR with their aircraft and produce a gain in efficiency of 400 percent relative to ground-based surveys.

The workers in the enterprise for remote sensing and industrial and research flights are very proud of the fact that through their work in industrial flights and remote sensing they have helped to make GDR aviation an important factor in national economic intensification. On the other hand, it is well known that the possible applications of up-to-date aviation in the economy and in science are still far from exhausted and can make a decisive contribution to the acceleration of scientific-technical progress in the republic as a whole. The 11th SED Congress established high standards for the coming years. For that reason, the tasks of INTERFLUG in the direction of research flights were expanded. It was charged with doing research for and together with science for the national economy, with making the areas of industrial flights and remote sensing more efficient, and with developing new applications for aviation to increase the intensification factor further.

Modification of the L-410 UVP As a Remote Sensing Aircraft of INTERFLUG

Figure 1 (key begins on next page):




Key:

1. Front pane de-icing
2. Windshield wiper
3. Sensor for temperature indicator
4. Floodlight for position 5
5. Ice indicator
6. Convex side pane
7. Copilot
8. Commander
9. Air intake for fresh air jets
10. VHF antenna
11. Turret for radiation measurement
12. Rubber lining to protect against pieces of ice thrown out by the propeller de-icing
13. Shelf for film cassettes
14. Tilttable and collapsible work table for the navigator
15. Floor hatch for the navigation sight
16. Pocket for navigation tools and maps
17. Navigator's seat
18. Door
19. Port photo hatch for oblique shots
20. Instrument panel with indicators for camera temperature, flight altitude, speed, time and course, among others
21. Operating control for MKF-6 camera
22. Navigation light
23. Operating control for the intercom
24. Operating control for the RW-18 radio altimeter
25. Connection for oxygen equipment
26. Hose of the oxygen mask
27. Cabin heating
28. Aileron control linkage
29. Control linkage for landing flaps
30. Cameraman
31. Cabin lights
32. Cameraman's seat
33. Fresh air jet
34. VHF transmitting antenna
35. VHF receiving antenna
36. Air escape of the cabin lights
37. Swirling plates
38. Horizontal stabilizer
39. Horizontal stabilizer de-icing
40. Vertical stabilizer
41. Vertical stabilizer de-icing
42. Stabilization surface
43. Aerodynamic horn balance of the vertical stabilizer
44. Navigation light
45. Electrostatic discharger
46. Vertical rudder hinge
47. Vertical rudder trim flap
48. Fin for increasing directional stability
49. Emergency spur

50. Port antenna of the radio altimeter
51. Rear cabin end wall
52. Radio compass
53. Toilet room also usable as a darkroom through the use of a blackout curtain
54. Toilet
55. Darkroom curtain
56. Bipartite door
57. Darkroom work plate
58. Stowage space for tool kit and tarpaulins
59. Starboard photo hatch for oblique shots
60. Housing for position 61
61. Cover for rear floor photo hatch
62. Shelf
63. MRB cassette
64. Stowage space for filter and other accessories
65. Hatch cover glass
66. Rear floor photo hatch
67. MRB camera
68. MRB cassette
69. Camera suspension with adjusting device
70. Mount for inclined camera position
71. Transmitter/receiver block for RW-18 radio altimeter
72. Work plate of the cameraman
73. Starboard main landing gear wheel
74. Navigator
75. STV1 camera control sight
76. Hatch for position 75
77. Hatch cover glass
78. Navigation sight
79. Foot switch for intercom
80. Headrest
81. Forward floor photo hatch
82. Hatch cover glass
83. Forward camera hatch cover
84. Camera suspension
85. MKF-6 camera
86. MKF-6 cassette
87. Camera adjustment
88. Housing for position 83
89. Loop antenna
90. Dynamic airspeed indicator
91. Nose wheel landing gear cover
92. Sensor for flight control equipment
93. Air intake for cabin heating
94. Transponder
95. Landing searchlight
96. Housing for positions 20 and 21
97. Cockpit door

Figure 2:



Key: (numbers correspond to the positions on figure 1)

- 39. Horizontal stabilizer de-icing
- 48. Fin for increasing lateral stability
- 50. Antenna of the radio altimeter
- 52. Radio compass
- 61. Housing for rear floor photo hatch cover
- 69. Rear floor photo hatch
- 73. Main landing gear wheels
- 76. Hatch for the camera control sight
- 78. Navigation sight
- 81. Forward floor photo hatch
- 88. Housing of the forward floor hatch cover
- 89. Loop antenna of the radio compass
- 90. Dynamic airspeed indicator
- 91. Nose wheel landing gear cover
- 93. Air intake for cabin heating
- 95. Landing searchlight cover

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CSO: 2300/5

ECONOMY

POLAND

GUIDELINES FOR JOB CERTIFICATION PROCESS PUBLISHED

**Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (REFORMA GOSPODARCZA supplement No 80 pp 1,4) in Polish
10 Jul 86**

[Text] On the basis of paragraph 3, point 1 of the program of activities connected with reviewing and certification of jobs in state-owned businesses (supplement to the Council of Ministers resolution no 29/86 of 10 March 1986 on job review and certification in state-owned enterprises):

- 1) The guidelines for job review and certification that are a supplement to the order are established;
- 2) The order goes into effect on the day it is signed.

Principles for Reviewing Job Certification in Enterprises

Systematic and regular job review and certification in enterprises is one of the basic organizational measures for increasing the efficiency of production. Certification and review are aimed at increasing labor productivity, streamlining the exploitation of fixed assets, more rational use of material and labor resources, improving the technical, technological and organizational level of jobs and organizational cells within an enterprise and improving the working conditions and job safety of workers.

Periodical job review and certification is a permanent element of management and should be carried out at the same time as work (jobs and technological operations) is analyzed and evaluated according to criteria defined in the "Universal method of job evaluation -- UMEWAP -- 85".

1. The Range of Job Review and Certification

All jobs in an enterprise should be subject to review and certification: blue-collar and non blue-collar jobs, production (service) jobs and technical, economic and administrative support. A job is defined as the number of machines and work places covered by one worker in the performance of his duties. If one machine (device) is serviced by more than one person, then the

number of jobs is the number of workers as defined in the service norms. If a job is performed in more than one shift, it is still defined as a single job.

2. The Purpose of Job Review and Certification

Job review and certification in an enterprise should serve the following goals:

- 1) to balance jobs with labor resources, improve organization within the enterprise and liquidate errors and shortcomings in the division and performance of work;
- 2) to evaluate the technical advancement and condition of machinery and equipment and to modernize and improve the technical level of job equipment;
- 3) to evaluate the state of operation of fixed assets including their level of utilization and efficient operation of fixed assets including efficient use of production potential;
- 4) to evaluate the organizational status within the enterprise and streamline organizational structures and their functions;
- 5) to evaluate working conditions and job safety and means of their improvement;
- 6) to liquidate inefficient jobs that fail to meet contemporary technical, technological and organizational requirements.

3. Preparation For Job Review and Certification

3.1. Job review and certification should be preceded by the following work:

- 1) The forming of plant and division groups whose task is to conduct the job review and certification. The director of the plant group should be the deputy director of technical affairs and the division groups should be led by the division director.
- 2) An inventory of all jobs within the enterprise and their classification as either worker or nonworker jobs and their organization according to the various levels, divisions and departments.
- 3) The establishment of a plan and schedule for job review and certification and statement of organizational cells and persons responsible for the scheduled and proper conduct of the job review and certification.
- 4) Preparation of examples of "job certificates" for worker and nonworker posts and adapted to the type and character of work performed in these jobs as well as instructions on how these documents are to be completed.

5) Familiarizing persons appointed to carry out the job review and certification with its principles and methods.

6) In agreement with the plant trade union and political and professional organizations, the conduct of a campaign to familiarize employees with the principles of the job review and certification, its benefits to the employees and firm and to encourage them to take part in the work of the plant and division groups by submitting their own observations and suggestions on how to improve job efficiency.

3.2. The group conducting the job review and certification should have access to all materials and documents needed to review and certify jobs and especially technical documentation including factory and operating documents, material consumption standards, time and worker norms, job instructions, job charts, records, services, organizational schemes, information flow-charts and decision-making schemes, document flow-charts, etc. and typical operating, technical and organizational solutions prepared by the department or branch group to serve as a basis for comparing and evaluating jobs.

4. Principles for Blue-Collar Job Review and Certification

4.1. The review of a blue-collar job should consider:

- 1) the job's position within the production process;
- 2) the type and range of work performed under the given job;
- 3) the equipment used within that job and its disposition;
- 4) the work methods and system (individual or group);
- 5) work organization;
- 6) job personnel;
- 7) working conditions;
- 8) the state of job safety.

4.2. A job review should be combined with evaluation of:

- 1) technical level;
- 2) technological level;
- 3) organizational level;
- 4) working conditions and safety;

5) economic conditions and comparison of the determined state and level with typical technical and technological solutions, work norms and department and branch norms with regard to world standards.

4.3. The technical and technological level of a job (T) should be evaluated with regard to:

- 1) the degree of machine, equipment and instrumentation advancement (T1);
- 2) machinery and equipment production capacity (T2);
 - a) the actual technical state in comparison to parameters set by factory specifications and existing operating requirements,
 - b) actual production capacity as compared to the rated capacity,
 - c) level of depreciation,
- 3) how well the job's technical equipment corresponds to the type of production tasks and quality requirements (T3);
- 4) utilization of the technical capabilities of machinery and equipment (T4);
- 5) level of advancement of the technological process (T5);
- 6) how well the technological process concurs with technological specifications (T6);
- 7) the efficiency at which materials and raw materials are used (T7).

4.4. Organizational level of the job (O) should be evaluated according to:

- 1) the rationality of the job's relationship to other jobs within the given operating and production process (O1);
- 2) whether technical equipment is arranged at the job site in a manner rational enough to allow proper synchronization of operations and activities performed within that job (O2);
- 3) degree of rationality by which a job is staffed (O3);
 - a) number of workers and how well they are qualified for that job as well as the required authority and type of work performed,
 - b) division of tasks between particular workers and how their work is coordinated,
 - c) number of shifts (work performed on one shift should receive the highest satisfactory mark),
 - d) the correctness of applied work norms and the extent to which they are fulfilled,
 - e) how well work time is used by employees,

- f) form of payments (piece-work, per-hour, time with bonus or by daily output).
- 4) organization of transportation between operations (supply of materials and raw materials, movement of materials and semi-finished products on to subsequent operations, receipt of production and wastes (04);
- 5) production quality and quantity control (05);
- 6) organization of maintenance and operational support (repairs, conservation, regeneration, diagnosis and the supply of replacement parts, operating fluids, fuels, energy, etc.) (06).

4.5. Evaluation fo working conditions (W) should consider:

- 1) the degree of job automation and mechanization (W1);
- 2) ergonomic adaptation of machinery and equipment (W2);
- 3) conditions of the work environment such as lighting, temperature, air purity, humidity, etc. (W3);
- 4) degree of endangerment from chemical and physical factors (W4);
- 5) the degree of job stress due to position, physical exertion, psychic exertion, etc. (W5).

4.6. Evaluation of job safety (Z) should consider the following elements:

- 1) provision at the job site of technical documentation, instructions, etc. (Z1);
- 2) provision of safety equipment and signalling and their technical state (Z2);
- 3) provision of workers with personal safety and protective gear such as protective clothing and shoes and safety screens and how they are used by the workers (Z3);
- 4) provision of fire-fighting equipment, explosion-prevention equipment and electrical shock prevention equipment (Z4);
- 5) use of warning sings at the job (Z5).

4.7. Evaluation of the economic conditions (E) at the job should consider and award points for:

- 1) motivational function of wages and whether they are based on quantity and quality of work and thrift;

- 2) motivational function of bonuses -- for example, the amount of the bonus according to the individual or collective work contribution (5 points), the crew work contribution (4 points) or the performance of work by the enterprise as a whole (2 points);
- 3) number of professions per worker (3 points at most);
- 4) use of worker qualifications at the given job, for example:
 - according to the requirements set by "UMEWAP-85" (5 points),
 - one degree less (4 points),
 - two degrees less (3 points),
 - three degrees less (2 points),
- 5) use of worker experience at the given job, evaluated as in point 4.

4.8. Each element of the job review (points 4.3-4.7) should be evaluated according to its accordance with the standard level, operating requirements and standard solutions. A job review should be combined with job assessment according to degrees 5,4,3,2 in reference to every elementary factor.

To comparatively evaluate specific jobs, it is necessary to take for each element (T,O,W,Z,E) the following values of the elementary factors (synthetic element), for example:

- 1) evaluation of the technical and technological level of the job:

$$T = (T_1+T_2+T_3+T_4+T_5+T_6+T_7) : 7$$

- 2) evaluation of the organizational level of the job:

$$O = (O_1+O_2+O_3+O_4+O_5+O_6) : 6$$

- 3) evaluation of the working conditions at the job:

$$W = (W_1+W_2+W_3+W_4+W_5) : 5$$

- 4) evaluation of the job safety:

$$Z = (Z_1+Z_2+Z_3+Z_4+Z_5) : 5$$

- 5) evaluation of the economic conditions of the job:

$$E = (E_1+E_2+E_3+E_4+E_5) : 5$$

5. Principles of Reviewing and Evaluating Non Blue-Collar Jobs.

5.1. The review of a non blue-collar job should be carried out according to similar principles and considers the following:

- 1) the type of work performed in the given organizational cell;
- 2) the type and range of work performed at the given job;
- 3) the type of materials and documents worked with;
- 4) job equipment;
- 5) job personnel;
- 6) job environmental conditions.

5.2. The review of a non blue-collar job should be combined with careful analysis and evaluation of:

- 1) the division of work and work relationships at given jobs within the given organizational cell;
- 2) the methods and procedure by which materials and documents are handled;
- 3) the flow of documentation and information necessary to the performance of work in a given job;
- 4) the degree of job mechanization and the technical advancement of the job equipment;
- 5) number of employees and their professional qualifications and training in comparison to the requirements and type of work performed;
- 6) the division and coordination of work between individual jobs;
- 7) how well work time is used by employees;
- 8) the system of monitoring the performance of assigned work by individual employees or organizational cells;
- 9) the suitability and usefulness of a function (set of activities) according to criteria such as the following: why the work is done, for whom or what is it performed, whether this job can be eliminated, what effects its elimination might have, whether the job can be combined with another one, whether similar information can be gained from another function and whether the analyzed function performs superficial or unnecessary work;
- 10) the labor-intensiveness of the function (by calculating, for example, the number of working days per year) and of specific activities within that function.

6. A job should be evaluated according to the criteria of its complexity, degree of responsibility, stress and degree of environment difficulty according to the "UMEWAP-85" method.

7. Materials for reviewing and evaluating a job (paragraphs 4 and 5) should be filled out with the information and observations gained from workers employed in that job and their immediate superiors and this information and remarks should include critical assessment of the technical, technological and organization state of the job, forms and methods of work and working conditions.

8. Analysis of the Job Review and Evaluation Results

8.1. A job review should be concluded with a comprehensive analysis of all of the gathered material to see whether it agrees with the existing norms, specifications and patterns.

8.2. The general evaluation of work (K) should be established as the mean of specific evaluations and assessed elements and therefore:

$$K = (T+O+W+Z+E) : 5$$

8.3. On the basis of the job review and evaluation:

1) the causes of shortcomings, faults and errors should be established along with their sources both on and outside of the job;

2) recommendations and proposals be prepared for changes in technical equipment, improvement of the operating processes associated with the job, improvement of work organization and improvement of working conditions and job safety;

3) the causes of faults from outside of the job be indicated along with suggestions for their elimination.

9. Job Certification

9.1. Comprehensive evaluation of a job should form the basis for its certification.

9.2. Job certification consists of formulating one of the following conclusions:

1) recognition of the usefulness of the given job in its current technical, technological and organizational state evaluated as sufficiently modern and in accordance with all existing norms and standards if all elementary criteria have received a least sufficient marks (in other words, the synthetic factor cannot be less than 3);

- 2) the necessity of carrying out the stipulated changes and improvements that will encourage proper use of the job in its further operation (partially certified job) if the general indicator is no lower than 3 (sufficient);
- 3) recognition of the job as superfluous because of its little utilization, the need to eliminate it because of its serious deviations from existing operating requirements and standards and bad working conditions if the evaluation is lower than 3 (sufficient).

10. The Preparation of a "Job Card (Certificate)"

For every job, a "job card (certificate)" should be prepared according to the pattern set in Supplement 1 and adapted to the character of the work in various jobs. The card should serve as the document to be used for making changes in the work processes, production and administration and should be kept in current standing with changes in those process.

11. Preparation of a "Job Description Card"

It is recommended that job reviews and certifications be used to prepare the job description cards (Supplement 2) for that form the basis for establishing pay rate ratios between professions and jobs within the firm. The specific principles of evaluating work and fixing prices for a given type of work are defined in the "UMEWAP-85" method.

12. Summarizing the Results of a Job Review and Certification

12.1. Once the review and certification of all jobs is finished, it is necessary to summarize the results by:

- 1) evaluating the technical state and how modern the fixed assets are and their state of exploitation;
- 2) balancing labor resources;
- 3) establishing whether a job:
 - is superfluous and subject to elimination;
 - requires changes, modernization or streamlining.
- 4) developing a plan for changing the technical equipment used in the given job, streamlining its organization and improving working conditions and job safety by using the recommendations and proposals of the groups conducting the job review and certification;
- 5) changing the division of work in order to improve the use of work time and worker skills;

6) determining the necessary costs as well as technical, material and financial possibilities for introducing the changes described in points 3 and 4.

12.2. The faults determined through the job review and certification procedure and those coming from causes outside of the given job should indicate areas that must be streamlined and improved such as:

- 1) organization of the enterprise's organizational cells and their structure and synchronization of their work;
- 2) the management of materials, tools and energy;
- 3) the organization of the internal factory transportation;
- 4) the system of production preparation and monitoring;
- 5) the organization of machinery conservation and repair;
- 6) the system used to relay information, documentation and decisions.

12.3. The project for changes should be included in the enterprise's annual and prospective planning.

13. The Organization of Work in Job Review and Certification

13.1. The specific terms for the conduct of the job review and certification are to be set by the enterprise director on the basis of the department's job review and certification group's recommendations and instructions.

13.2. The director should:

- 1) set up a factory job review and certification group and division groups for the larger enterprises and these are to include highly-qualified personnel from the factory operating services (maintenance and repair), technical and technological services, the labor organization services and the job safety service and may also include specialists from outside of the enterprise;
- 2) gather and prepare necessary material such as the items named in paragraph 3, point 2;
- 3) conduct preparatory work for the job review and certification correctly and on time according to paragraph 3.1, points 2-6 and paragraph 3.2.
- 4) declare organizational cells and persons responsible for carrying out the job review and certifications procedures on schedule and according to methodological principles;

- 5) in agreement with the plant union organization and the worker's self-management council, conduct a campaign to explain to workers the benefits of the job review and certification and to encourage employees to take part in the work of the division and plant groups by submitting their own observations and suggestions on their jobs and on means of streamlining them;
- 6) decide on the basis of the job review to eliminate given jobs at the recommendation of the division groups;
- 7) introduce to factory plans annual and long-term tasks for the realization of technical, technological and organizational solutions and those for the improvement of working conditions and job safety that were indicated by the results of the job review and certification;
- 8) to submit to the founder's organs information on the course and results of the job reviews and certifications;

13.3. The tasks of the department groups for job review and certification include:

- 1) determining the technical, technological and organizational level of the department's jobs and their working conditions;
- 2) developing a "job card (certificate)" for each job;
- 3) formulating conclusions about job certification;
- 4) develop conclusions and recommendations about making changes and streamlining jobs;
- 5) formulating conclusions on means of improving employee professional qualifications and if necessary, teaching them a second profession.

13.4. The factory group's tasks include:

- 1) verifying documents on the job reviews and certifications carried out by the department groups and formulating final conclusions and recommendations on the further operation or liquidation of certain jobs;
- 2) reviewing the conclusions of the department groups on the introduction of changes and means of streamlining jobs;
- 3) developing annual and long-term plans for improving the enterprise's technical and organizational level;
- 4) monitoring the conduct of the job review and certification within the enterprise to assure that it is carried out correctly and according to schedule;

5) developing collective conclusions on the completed job reviews and certifications and submitting them for the approval and decisions of the enterprise director.

14. Closing Remarks

14.1. Periodic job review and certification should become an integral part of the enterprise management system.

14.2. Job review and certification carried out on the basis of thorough analysis and evaluation of the given job's usefulness to the entire enterprise is a source of information on the causes of faults and poor efficiency in work processes and forms the basis for the introduction of changes and modernizing measures to improve the functioning and organization of specific jobs as well as cells and structural organizations within the enterprise.

14.3. The correctness of comprehensive analysis and evaluation of every job depends on the correct realization of preparatory work and assembly of the necessary standard-setting materials and the responsibility of highly-qualified specialists appointed to serve in the groups carrying out the job reviews and certifications.

14.4. Job reviews and certifications are a labor-intensive undertaking and require a great deal of effort but are indispensable to the achievement of progress in improving the efficiency of enterprise activities.

Job Card (Certification)

Supplement No 2

1. Name of the organizational cell (department) _____
2. Title of job _____
3. Type of work performed _____
4. Employee name _____
5. Job personnel (one-person, more than one person, more than one profession) _____
6. Marks for the technical conditions _____
7. Marks for the technological conditions _____
8. Marks for the organizational conditions _____
9. Marks for the environmental conditions and job safety _____
10. Marks for the economic conditions _____
11. Marks for the accordance of the employee's professional education with the job requirements according to the "UMEWAP-85" method _____
12. Marks for the employee's work experience according to the "UMEWAP-85" method _____
13. General evaluation _____
14. Recommendations of the working group:
 - 1) The job satisfies technical, technological, organizational and economic requirements and can continue to function _____
 - 2) The job can be properly utilized if the following changes and improvements are made:
 - technical equipment of the job _____
 - organization of the job _____
 - increasing job efficiency _____
 - working conditions and job safety _____
 - economic conditions _____
 - 3) The job should be liquidated because:
 - it is too little utilized _____
 - bad working conditions and excessive stress _____
 - it considerably deviates from existing operational requirements and standards and this problem cannot be eliminated _____
 - other reasons _____

Note: The operations and activities performed in this job should be transferred to _____ along with (or without) the technical equipment.

The workers employed in this job should be transferred to _____

Group director

Director of the organizational cell

Sample of a job description for valuation of work

Supplement no 2

I. Title of job _____

II. Characteristics of the activities (operations) performed at this job

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III. Detailed description of the work

Criteria	Detailed job description	Maximum number of points in criterium	Points
A.1. Required vocational education		.75	
A.2. Required vocational experience		50	
A.3. Creative thinking		40	
A.4. Ability		26	
A.5. Cooperation		20	
B.1. Responsibility for work and results		40	
B.2. Responsibility for decisions		40	
B.3. Responsibility for managing other people		40	
B.4. Responsibility for outside contacts		15	
B.5. Responsibility for job property		20	
B.6. Responsibility for the safety of others		20	
C.1. Physical effort		40	
C.2. Psychological effort		20	
C.3. Mental effort		25	
C.4. Monotony		15	
C.5. Psychological stress due to low prestige		25	
D.1. Material work environment		70	
D.2. Danger of accidents		20	

12261
CSO: 2600/686

ECONOMY

POLAND

JOB APPRAISAL, CERTIFICATION PROCESSES DISCUSSED, DEFENDED

Need for Job Appraisal Explained

Warsaw ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIAŁY in Polish No 37, 13 Sep 86 pp 3-6

[Article by [Kras.]: "The Need for Job Appraisal"]

[Text] We have already known for some time now that poorly-conceived principles of socialism can cause more harm than good. A classic example of this is a slogan of social justice which is actually just the opposite: pay everyone equally with the idea that everyone has an equal stomach.

It seems that when life is hard, it is this distorted concept of "justice" that people in almost all places of employment or professions use to compare their own earnings with those at other enterprises or professions. What most people compare their wages to are those of miners but at the same time, shipyard workers point at steel-workers, for example, while engineers complain about what blue-collar workers earn and teachers lament the wages of engineers and so on and so on. People compare their wages with the national average or the average in their industry or region, both past and present. The hidden or outspoken conclusion is often that all wages must be raised to the average level which is naturally more convenient for the given group or profession.

Under this high temperature of wage comparisons, no one in interested in why wages must reflect the nature of the work itself, its complexity or its quality. Such thinking reveals an attitude of narrow-mindedness toward all but one's earnings (and standard of living) without any regard for their natural connection with work. After all, that is just what we are accustomed to reproaching visiting compatriots from the rich West with and what surprises foreigners visiting our country.

Let us therefore tell ourselves from the start that such "equality" and such "social justice":

- have nothing in common with the historical socialist principle of the distribution of goods according to work;*
- have made it impossible to rationally control economic processes and the correct development of various sectors of the economy relative to the current needs of society because the instruments of this control are, aside from the absolute wage level, the differences between wages in individual sectors, branches, professions and jobs;
- are a violation of the letter and spirit of reform whose foundation is a stricter and more apparent connection between work and earnings and the use of wages as a means of motivating people.

At the same time, it is just and socially justifiable for wages to reflect the real work done, the physical and mental exertion demanded and the need to give preference to certain areas of the economy.

Proper and Improper Wage Differences

Of course, everything said above is a simplification of the problem. The problems of dividing wealth and wages that fulfill diverse functions** are very complicated and cannot be explained within the brief limits of this article. However, one must consider basic concepts because once they are understood, it is easier not only to more correctly evaluate the phenomena around us but also to act in the proper manner.

If we intend to create a stronger connection between wages and work, we must differentiate them.

First of all, this differentiation is the product of the very value of the job, its characteristics, scale of difficulty and the inertia of matter that the employee must overcome regardless of the subjective possibilities of the given person.

Second, wages differences must also be decided by the quality of the work performed which depends in part not only on the equipment and technology but also on skill, desire and the feeling of responsibility of the person doing the work.

*Realization of the principle of "to each according to his needs" is characteristic of a higher phase of communism and is presently impossible because it makes no allowance for the production conditions which, as we know, are what finally determine how goods will be distributed.

** Wages fulfill varied and often diverging functions. They are not only an element of production costs but or a source of popular income but also a tool used to realize various economic and social goals.

There also exist situations and causes due to which workers receive unequal pay for the same amount and quality of work. That too can be socially justified and serve to fulfill the common need because to a large extent, pay ratios are the result of the assumed strategy for economic growth. For example, the difference in wages can be the result of a need to attract people into employment in sectors preferred by the economic policy. The last two years have also intensified quite clearly the need to recompensate simple jobs and especially hard, unpleasant and dangerous jobs.

Regardless of how appropriate our present economic policy and its large differentiations in wages, there still exist great disproportions between branches and within individual plants that cannot be explained in any way. These are glaring absurdities that should be severely criticized in public.

Even the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs often has problems of this sort. during meetings, how is it possible to reply to attacks against situations in which an office secretary for a mine earns as much as the director of a food industry plant? Or what is one to think about a situation in which the director of a plant employing several thousand people places 165th on the wage list at that establishment?

There are also the problems of a very delicate but fundamental nature with important social and economic implications that were described by a representative of the ministry at the May meeting of the Economic Reform Commission's Group III on enterprise affairs.

Characterizing the reasons for the approach taken and the state of work on the preparation and introduction of a method of appraising work, the ministry representative stressed the widespread nature of pressure exerted on the ministry by workers and the force of demands to halt the growth of disproportions in wages between different professional groups and industries because at the present time, no one is really satisfied.

A special role is played in this tug-of-war over wages by their level in the mining industries.

The average wage there is presently twice as high as the national average. According to ministry data, in other countries in which the mining industries also have a high position, these wages ratios are usually somewhere in the area of 1.3-1.5:1. Because other professional groups try to catch up, this results in spiralling wage costs.

It is not only grass-roots pressure that has made it necessary to seriously consider worker feelings and demands. The ministry also tried to determine whether the wage ratios between blue-collar workers and non blue-collar workers and between skilled and unskilled workers were correct. As has already been said, a lot of enterprises and their employees have proposed that this problem be resolved by bringing lower wages up to the level of the national average.

But the ministry took the position that manipulating the average wage would solve nothing, not to mention the inflationary character of such a measure. Bringing other wages up to the national average would only raise the average wage and make it necessary to automatically hike up other wages without any of the economic reform's stipulated connection between earnings and work and efficiency.

Some enterprises again have a different prescription for shortcomings in wages and that is restoring the wage proportions of past years. Thus, the steel industry would, for example, use the wage proportions of 1978, business would base its on the year 1976 and communal services would base theirs on the proportions of the 1960's.

Knowing the public reaction, a series of misunderstandings about wages and their mutual proportions, nonsensical and often harmful discrepancies would most certainly become an emotional issue because poor wage proportions would cause a series of negative effects. They would violate the principle of social fairness expressed in the slogan "to each according to his work" and cause frustration and therefore worker indifference to their jobs. They would also make it hard to find people willing to accept low-paying jobs, increase worker turnover and suppress any interest in improving professional skills.

The Necessary Measure of Work

How are we to fairly assess the work of different people and set their wages in a way fitting a worker's contribution to the national income? How are we to create wage ratios between different industries, professions and jobs that are based on the amount and quality of work? And how do we control economic processes and the growth of certain areas of our economy?

Our one solution is to find some measure of work, a system that would make it possible to compare different types of activities and more objectively evaluate them.

As the reasoning has so far shown, there are various approaches to assessing the value of every type of work.

The determination of the objective demands of a given type of work and establishing its relative value is known as the appraisal of work.

Analytic methods of appraising work are based on determining the "value" of the work on the basis of separate criteria such as, for example, the complexity of the work, responsibility and its associated physical and mental exertion and the establishment of a point scale. This is not an entirely objective measure but in the opinion of the specialists who developed it, it is the only one that makes it possible to compare two entirely different types of work.

It must be remembered that the object of the appraisal is the objective difficulties expressed in the resistance offered by any form of work to anyone performing that work regardless of his skills or predisposition. Such an appraisal establishes the physical, mental and psychological requirements associated with a given type of work rather than the personal traits of the worker or how efficiently he works.

Comprehensive study of all types of work and the creation of a scale is supposed to make it possible to compare different kinds of jobs.

The appraisal method should above all become the basic instrument of factory pay policy.

It is hoped that the wide introduction of the universal method of work appraisal will contribute much to the realization of proper pay for proper work and create the basis for setting up correct pay ratios in all sectors, industries and branches.

Appraisal and Certification

Formally speaking, appraisal is an operation independent of job review and certification. However, as befits the logic of the measure, the Council of Ministers recommended that work appraisal also be included in job review and certification. Some people are wondering why the regulations on wage systems at places of employment were not preceded by work appraisal which is something that would be justifiable from all points of view.

This question is answered by the history of all attempts to use an appraisal method that would work.

As recently as 1981, the minister of labor at that time issued an order introducing the work appraisal method. This method, however, received sharp criticism from theoreticians and practitioners and was rejected. Another attempt as made in 1984 and the May 1984 Order Number 16 of the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs introduced a method that differed little from its predecessor in its complexity and imperfections. At the end of the same year, therefore, the ministry ordered the Institute of Labor and Social Affairs to work with a group of specialists to develop an analytical method of work appraisal. After nearly a year of work, they finally submitted to the ministry a proposal called the universal method of work appraisal, "UMEWAP-85".

This is now the recommended method for reviewing jobs but it has not yet been introduced into practice and will not until 1987. Many groups continue submit their own observations on the method and especially its application on a "macro" scale. Its very idea cannot arouse any doubt and its application within the framework of a job review meets the principle of rational combination of actions.

In later issues of this journal, we will return to discuss the characteristics of this method.

Appraisal Method Co-author Explains Process

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 16 Sep 86 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Zofia Jacukowicz of the Institute of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs by Krystyna Sonntag: "Job Appraisal: Method Instead of Intuition"]

[Text] Everyone agrees to the fundamental principle of "to each according to his work". People only begin to disagree when individual and group interests come into play. We are generally inclined to overestimate our own work and underestimate that of others. This very human tendency has been consolidated by the meanderings of the wage policies, the decades of wage disproportions between and within sectors and work appraisals based on intuition rather than method.

UMEWAP-85, the universal method of work appraisal developed by the Institute of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs is a tool that makes it possible to more precisely than ever before assess, measure and remunerate work.

How can we compare the work of a metal-worker and a teacher?

For an answer to this question, we turned to Docent Dr Zofia Jacukowicz, one of the co-authors of UMEWAP-85.

[Answer] Such comparisons cannot be made directly but we can distinguish the qualitative character of the given type of work and in this way determine its difficulty. To put it more simply, it is a matter of studying and establishing the criteria that characterize each form of work. These criteria are measured and then assigned a point value. Using this point scale, it is possible to compare different types of work. This measure can be applied to different jobs and therefore the metal-worker and the teacher in order to determine the amount of effort exerted by workers of different vocations.

[Question] I have to admit that this sounds somewhat vague.

[Answer] The UMEWAP-85 method of job appraisal assumes that the basic groups of criteria differentiating jobs are complexity, responsibility, stress and environmental conditions of the work place. These are synthetic criteria which are then broken down into even more specific elementary criteria. Therefore, the concept of complexity includes vocational education, work experience, creative thinking, ability and cooperation. This concerns one's level of experience in a given job and the qualifications required for that particular job. Therefore, if an employee has a master's degree and his job requires no more than a secondary school education, he receives the points awarded for the secondary education.

[Question] The holder of a master's degree selling parsley has already accepted this but not thanks to points but because this job is profitable. Returning to the principles of appraisal, let us also decipher the criterium of work stress.

[Answer] This case concerns physical, psycho-nervous and mental exertion and furthermore, the monotony or low prestige of a job. It is therefore assumed that there are different types of exertion and work may require muscle exertion or the taking of an uncomfortable position. Psycho-nervous exertion is associated with stress on the eyes or hearing and mental concentration. Mental stress requires the ability to work with information (associate, compare and make conclusions).

On the recommendation of specialists, we also included psychological stress caused by the low prestige of some jobs. It is understandable that we may want to encourage some people to take low-prestige work that is still important (certain types of communal work) by giving them higher wages. After all, it is hard to find people anywhere to do some forms of work so you have to pay them more.

[Question] What is the maximum number of points that can be awarded on this scale?

[Answer] 600. However, since no job can fulfill all such criteria to the maximum degree, the highest we have seen so far is 410 and that was for the head of a surgical ward but that does not mean that every surgeon or ward head would receive quite as many. This was just a case of one person in a particular hospital.

It is worth pointing out that the method was developed for common forms of work and there is therefore no allowance made for the sort of jobs in which one criteria is very strong. For example, the criterium of ability has far fewer points awarded if it is applied to a ballet dancer or a trapeze artist. But these jobs require certain skills that go beyond the average scale.

To be perfectly clear, I must also point out that we wish to appraise the requirements of work at a given job rather than employee himself. This method does not therefore measure the efficiency of work in terms of output. Nevertheless, correct determination of the differences between work demands is one of the conditions that must be fulfilled to properly reward worker efficiency.

[Question] All of that sounds complicated and hard to understand. One might suspect that UMEWAP will be regarded with some apprehension at places of employment.

[Answer] The synthetic and elementary criteria used in our method are the result of analysis of work demands and existing wages in Poland. They make it possible to rather precisely characterize the most of the common types of

jobs. These criteria can be used to appraise work more accurately than the previously-used qualifications ratings. Of course, it is hard in a short conversation to explain that more precisely. I would have to use tables showing specific point appraisals. I would like to add that this method has been received with great interest at places of employment.

[Question] It would be interesting to know how many points one would receive for vocational training or creative thinking?

[Answer] Vocational training is the most highly appraised criterium at 75 points while creative thinking is worth 40. Low points are awarded for monotony and psycho-nervous exertion but professional experience and responsibility for the results of one's work rank fairly well on the point scale.

I would like to point out that the group that developed UMEWAP also included persons with daily experience in industry and that the method was tested at the Mielec Transportation Equipment Plant. It is presently being verified at the Glogow Copper Works.

[Question] The Bielsko-Biala Apena Plant has assessed the method as a very helpful one in organizing that plant's wage policies.

[Answer] I feel that it is worth mentioning a rather significant indicator of its practicality. If enterprises have to appraise work, then they must look at it as a whole rather than parcel it out to individual departments because that would cause friction between different employee groups.

Work appraisal should serve to develop pay scales for determining categories used to classify both blue-collar and non blue-collar jobs and is therefore a useful tool for weeding out complications and putting pay ratios in better order.

[Question] Please explain one thing that is still unclear. The job appraisal for a welder has a certain value on the point scale. Therefore, should a specialist from a profitable enterprise receive the same pay as one from a less profitable organization? If so, that would go against the principles of reform.

[Answer] How the points translate into actual earnings should depend on the financial condition of the enterprise. This does not detract anything from the value of the method which, thanks to the objectivity of its assessment of job demands, should help to stem demands for higher wages.

Reader Criticisms of Certification Answered

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Andrzej Leszcynski: "Certification: Does It Make Sense?"]

[Text] Our reader Katarzyna Janda from Lubicz was influenced by my article on job certification and wrote a letter containing many alarming questions, doubts and outright suspicion as to whether this enterprise can succeed...

Our reader writes: "Are you not really laughing inside at this review of organizational structures and the job review?". I can seriously answer this by saying that no, I find it funny neither privately nor professionally. After all, my private feelings and my work are not opposite spheres of life. I will explain why I look at job certification with so much hope (privately and professionally).

About Coercion

I am thankful to Katarzyna Janda for one question in particular in which she expressed the essence of her doubts: "Can you imagine an order by the head of state in a capitalist country declaring that places of employment must conduct job certifications?".

No, I have never heard about an order of this type in France, England, the German Federal Republic, the USA or any other highly-developed capitalist country. To be frank, initiatives like that are not necessary because the market rules are strict and the competition forces businesses to evaluate jobs on an almost daily basis. They must constantly examine a given job's productivity, organizational efficiency and modern character. Under these conditions, so-called economic reconnaissance of concerns and large firms plays a significant role. The process of modernizing production is a question of survival on the market.

In Poland, however, in spite of the gradual assimilation of economic reform, we have still not managed to incorporate the economic coercion mechanism written into the philosophy of our reform. This is not, of course, a brutal mechanism used to break people, destroy production assets in the western style (see, for example, the unpardonable economic strife of the recent Brazilian television serial "Avenida Paulista" or the Australian "Return to Eden").

I am referring to mechanisms that would induce workers and managers to greater efficiency, prudence or even economic cunning and to a sense of socialist enterprise. The stakes in such a game would be higher or lower earnings, preservation or loss of the given enterprise's independence or even the prospect of changing place of employment or profession.

There is no doubt as to what will determine the maturation of these mechanisms. Even our reader stated that: "We must have real reform and not

just talk about it". I would add just one correction: we need full reform along with all the necessary tools and an integral built-in form of economic coercion. For as long as there is no such coercion...

Wait a minute: why do we not have such a form of coercion? That is most certainly what Katarzyna Janda and some other readers would ask at this point. We have introduced an economic reform under conditions of drastic economic imbalance of supplies and the market with a paucity of consumer goods and a skimpy offering of export products. There is no need to explain that in any detail to someone who has lived in Poland.

Concern for the living conditions of hundreds of thousands of economically weak families has dictated caution in our approach to prices but unless we do something about these prices, it is hard to think about any form of economic coercion. If prices, even contract prices are frozen through the use of ceilings, can we expect them to have any real effect on producer behavior? We cannot continue for more or less economically determined reasons to move away from basing prices on costs and start basing them on supply and demand. Economic coercion alleviates and sometimes even eliminates the growing amount of subsidies for production...

The Party Concept of Acceleration

These restrictions on economic coercion can even more greatly hinder the introduction of the mechanisms of economic reform which we were already unable to graft onto our economy during the crisis. Aside from recognizing and improving the economic reform, the resolution of the 10th Congress also stressed that:

"Accelerated restoration of economic balance, reorganization of price ratios, limitation of subsidies, strict observation of the principles of business self-financing, stricter thrift and work discipline are the primary goals of the second stage of economic reform".

I apologize for the somewhat long quotation but this fragment of the congress's resolution shows the party's intentions and the directions that it will take. Should we expect the concept of economic acceleration to begin having a measurable effect and intensify economic coercion? That is also the sense of the party's initiative on job certification which in March of this year was introduced by the Council of Ministers resolution.

At this point, I would also like take up another of this reader's doubts that is logically connected to all of the previous ones. In her letter, she wrote: "If the very directors of factories do not see any need for certifications, how can the central government order them?"

Will They Want to Certify?

First of all, it is not true that all enterprises have a reluctant attitude toward job certification. In the preceding article, I wrote that there are also those firms that are very excited about it and have already begun to carry it out without the proper preparation. I have and continue to warn them that without gathering all of the correct standards, patterns and examples of modern organization, certification cannot yield the correct results. There will simply be no material against which jobs can be compared and the purpose of job certification is to fulfill the most optimal work solutions.

As I have already said, I also know that there are economic activists that do not see the sense of certification or are against it for other reasons. It would be hard to get these people to carry out the certifications in a correct manner. However, I wish to point out that I am writing all of this in a speculative manner because I do see means of leading the doubters back down the path of virtue and the use of economic instruments.

I imagine that in accordance with the principles of the art, the results of job certification could become a condition for receiving credit, tax reductions or subsidies (but just as little as possible!) as well as a necessary element of factory wage systems.

I would also like to anticipate our reader's question of whether the entire issue cannot be so misconstrued as to just prop up the bank and ministries, etc. Therefore, certification is supposed to be carried out according to specific principles and using concrete standards and norms. In this case, the certification uses a method of objectivization rather than intuition. Jobs are supposed to be assessed from a point of view of specific contemporary patterns in Poland and around the world rather than according to what someone may think.

Certification is a well thought-out and objective method of influencing the economy's growth processes and especially the advancement of organizational progress. If it is combined with the use of economic instruments, it can play a major role. Whether or not it fulfills that role depends on how it is used but what is most important is whether it will become a lasting method for certifying jobs in rhythm with world technical and organizational progress in improving working conditions and job safety and in protecting the natural environment. Anyway, there is a chance that it will succeed.

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CSO: 2600/24

ECONOMY

POLAND

FULL EMPLOYMENT CRITICIZED FOR 'STRANGLING' ECONOMY

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 38, 20 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Jerzy Zyzyński: "A Seeming Shortage"]

[Text] The signals come from all over: there is a shortage of manpower for replacing pipe, building bridges, renovating hospitals, making bricks, or erecting buildings. There is a shortage of telephones owing to the shortage of manpower. There are no people available for cleaning weed-overgrown irrigation ditches. At the same time, there is a shortage of materials and equipment for all these operations. The economy is caught in the stranglehold of manpower shortages.

This situation appears to offer explicit proof of the necessity of abandoning myths deeply rooted in public awareness -- myths that handicap our economic growth.

The essence of economic growth lies in change. This means the expansion of some economic projects and the initiation of new ones. The employment barrier restricts this creative side of the development process: owing to the lack of sufficient manpower, enterprises cannot expand and the activation of new enterprises is being impeded.

This situation was very astutely characterized by Professor Gurij Marczuk (ZYCIE WARSZAWY, No 299, 1984): "At present the enlargement or expansion of enterprises would not be expedient. The entire manpower pool has been depleted. Were we to build more plants, we could not find the people to staff them. Or else we would have transfer manpower from some workplaces to others where its shortages are greater."

In such a situation, the sole prime mover of growth is technological progress, which increases productivity and hence also relieves manpower for commitment elsewhere.

Who is To Look for What?

However, the rise in labor productivity, if regarded as a panacea which we are eagerly awaiting like rain during a drought, has also become a myth. A myth, because, for example, the housing problem in this country cannot be rapidly

and effectively solved through a rise in labor productivity alone. For employment in the Polish construction industry accounts for 7.3 percent of total employment in Poland (compared with 8.3 percent in Bulgaria and 9.5 percent in Czechoslovakia), and for many years barely 500-700 new dwellings have been released for every 1,000 newlywed couples (compared with more than 1,000 dwellings in Bulgaria quite recently and as many as 1,400 dwellings in the GDR!). Thus even if our construction workers were suddenly to turn into titans of labor and receive the best equipment -- whereas in reality even poor equipment is scarce -- overcoming the lag and producing a surplus sufficient to create a buyer's market would still take too long: here there is a need for even a twofold increase in employment in the construction and building materials industry for a time. Otherwise, there is no chance of solving the housing problem, and there can only be halfway solutions with economically harmful side effects such as, e.g., the construction of plant-sponsored housing for employees.

The idea that economic growth also means after all the creation of new enterprises has been greatly neglected or even forgotten as it were. Except that this is not so simple as it has seemed to some people who thought that it would be enough to establish enterprises, give work to everyone, and then let the enterprises develop somehow, through technological progress and rise in productivity. It is not only innovative processes, especially the small-scale ones (many things begin on a small scale) but also requirements of flexibility that are decisive to the need to create new enterprises. What is more, this was realized only during the last decade when the green light was given to chiefly Polonia enterprises. Given the present sick economy, the advantages of these enterprises are offset anyhow by their negative consequences.

This points to the obvious conclusion that a healthy economy requires an efficiently functioning process of destruction in the sense of releasing manpower from unproductive fields and employing it in those domains of the economy that require a fast growth rate; here a shift of manpower in the direction of the service industries also is important.

Hence the reverse side of the process of structural changes, of that "folding up" of certain economic measures and hence also of enterprises. Growth is a complex mixture of creation and destruction: this relationship is organic and necessary.

In general the process of destruction is absent in this country, in which plant shutdowns and bankruptcies as well as the discharge of surplus manpower somehow do not work out. This is happening for many reasons.

The main reason is, I believe, the "full employment trap," which ensues from the pursuit of the, in this case, treacherous idea of so-called social security. A balanced full employment is achievable only when the luxury of slow growth can be afforded, with the growth rate being assured by technological progress and the natural increase in the labor force. In a converse situation, i.e., in the one obtaining in this country, people should be looking for work instead of work looking for people.

This also applies to all production factors and explicitly negates the thesis, formulated naively by certain economists, that economic policies should pursue the goal of complete utilization of production capacities and production factors. Of course, the utilization should be high, but it should not be complete, because a fundamental prerequisite for the efficient performance and growth of the economy is the existence of readily and rapidly available spare resources of all the factors, including -- and this has to be accepted -- manpower.

Growth in the absence of spare resources always necessitates choosing a part at the expense of the whole. If the old town of Krakow is to be restored, this means resources are to be diverted at the expense of some other area; if housing is to be built, this means less resources for building stores; if more combine harvesters are to be made, this means fewer passenger cars; if television sets are to be manufactured, this means that only telephones for public booths can be manufactured, and so on. Of course, spare resources, meaning surplus production capacities and surplus funds, in themselves will not dispense with the need to make a choice, but they will assuage it greatly; then the choice has an economically different sense anyhow.

The Charwoman and the Professor

The marketplace also represents a free flow of resources obeying roughly the same rules. The total exclusion of any discrete resource, meaning, e.g., manpower, from the operation of these rules readily results in a degeneration of the marketplace as well as in disturbances in the mechanism: these rules must operate in every stratum of the economy.

A situation in which work is looking for people engenders a number of negative consequences. Thus, workers demand higher wages and violations of work discipline often are tolerated, which is both a demoralizing factor and an inevitably inflationary factor. Priorities and the attendant higher wages paid for implementing them mean shortages of manpower and inevitable declines in output elsewhere; these scarcities spread like a destructive wave throughout the economy, in the form of a negative multiplier effect. A decline in supply also is a cause of price increases, which are yet another stimulus of inflation.

In some places wages are rising and in others they are not, so that workers quit; entire occupational groups (e.g., the so-called "budzetowka" [salaried employees]) feel "naturally" injured, while others are endowed with absurd privileges (the paradox of the charwoman who has better equipment than the university professor).

The end result is that evry manpower "reserve" is exploited -- "reserves" in quotation marks because they are quasi-reserves, being seeming, shallow, and relatively ineffective. For example, there is the employment of young mothers who should instead be bringing up their children. Perhaps the most dangerous (both economically and socially) longterm consequence is the inevitable tendency toward longer work hours in various forms and under various pretexts, whether at the state-owned workplace or when working "on one's own," whether working for double pay or building one's own house during leisure hours, and

so on. The potential of the human organism is limited: an employee who performs well in his off-duty hours performs badly "on duty." The principle of the division of labor is being strangely eroded, because, e.g., metalworkers and electronics workers become private home builders in their leisure hours, while others among us, although lacking the requisite skills, have to repair our own cars because we are unable to stand in a queue at 5 o'clock in the morning, or decorate our own dwellings because construction cooperatives lack skilled finishing workers. This means that people do work in occupations for which they are untrained, and this also means higher morbidity and death rates as well as greater frustrations. Shortening the work week is becoming virtually impossible, and this has repercussions not only on the economy.

The policy of full employment means that the economy is being driven toward a stalemate.

All these matters are immeasurably difficult. Economic policy has become a veritable Gordian knot. Can this knot be untied? Of a certainty yes.

The increase in employment is promoted by falsely reckoned norms, poor organization, and poor discipline. Given such "reserves," a reduction in employment would serve to markedly increase labor productivity. This is becoming more and more commonly understood. Job certification is precisely intended to remedy this; a person who is relatively unsuitable for his work position could be much more suitable in another position.

Such switching of workplaces reduces production cost, and hence also the price acceptable to the producer. This is clear. The dislodging of productively misplaced workers must thus be done on the scale of the entire economy. But there exist unjustifiably protected domains. A classic example is agriculture, where high prices (excessively high procurement subsidies) favor the worst producers who could be much more useful in, e.g., the construction industry, and whose land could produce much more if cultivated by better farmers. Such changes would reduce the prices of food, land, and housing.

Perhaps Finally a Strong Economy?

"Group" mentality, according to which entire worker groups are privileged and receive higher pay, with the membership itself in the group being a privilege, is inadmissible. True, this is often compelled by the blackmail of the large size of the group, by the myth of allegedly arduous nature of the work, or by seeming social interests. Of course, the average pay in certain occupations must be higher than in others, but individual approach must dominate. In every group, good workers should get better pay, poor workers worse pay, and the poorest workers should be eliminated from the group and shifted even to other occupations. This means both individuals and entire enterprises. The process of the displacement of the bad by the good is natural and indispensable to economic growth. The motivation may be two-sided: in addition to the positive wage incentives there must exist negative ones, such as the threat of discharge from work, bankruptcy, or at least reduction in pay.

A dynamic growth of the economy requires that the "dislodging" of surplus manpower should slightly predominate over its "absorption" by new economic

projects, so that every economic initiative would rapidly and without delay be implemented. Such a process creates some surplus of manpower on the labor market. It should be distinguished from unemployment as interpreted in the classical sense. Unemployment is a state of considerable surplus manpower, with many people remaining jobless for a long time. Under capitalism, unemployment is a consequence of the contradictions between capital and labor and always an obvious social evil. But this does not mean that under socialism the economy should be choked by full employment. The converse of unemployment also is a social evil. Thus the problem should be looked at from another angle. An essential category is the time of waiting for work, of looking for work. In such a situation the task of economic policy is to shorten that time and at the same time to care for job-seekers.

Surmounting the crisis and energizing the economy is certainly a difficult and costly task. It is difficult to both the nation and the authorities. For whom is it costly? I believe that it would be dangerous to link the specific factor represented by cost to the general factor represented by the society. An effect will be accomplished only if the least productive and least effective members of the society bear the onus of the cost. Ultimately, this is simply a question of tapping the tremendous latent potential of the nation — a potential that has been suppressed rather than exploited by the poorly organized economic system. A strengthened and perhaps finally strong economy is a potent ally to our country's friends, a partner of the rest of the world, and an absorbent market — and thereby also a co-creator of the economic prosperity of other countries.

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CSO: 2600/19

ECONOMY

POLAND

POLISH POSITION IN GATT TALKS OUTLINED BY OFFICIAL

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Sep 86 p 7

[Interview with Dr Boguslaw Sosnowski, Director of the Department of International Economic Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, by Tomasz Bartoszewicz: "Poland and the New GATT Round" subtitled "Before the Conference in Punta del Este"]

[Text] (C) In mid-September the Uruguayan locality of Punta del Este will be the site of a ministerial session of the member countries of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), intended to initiate a new round of international trade negotiations on the GATT's forum. The RZECZPOSPOLITA reporter interviewed the Director of the Department of International Economic Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Trade Dr Boguslaw Sosnowski about that round and the participation of our country in it.

[Question] Poland has been a full member of the GATT since 1967. It already took part in the Kennedy and Tokyo meetings. How will the new negotiations differ from their predecessors?

[Answer] The current meeting will aim at eliminating extra-tariff restrictions and regulating vital issues of world trade. These problems are extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the fact that, although the preparatory committee had completed as early as on 31 July of this year its work on drafting the ministerial declaration to be adopted at Punta del Este, a declaration that is to be the basis for subsequent negotiations, tremendous differences in positions still persist. A formal manifestation of these differences is the fact that the preparatory committee had been unable to achieve a consensus on proposals, so that the ministers will be provided at that meeting with three separate drafts of documents. Relatively the broadest support has been gained by the proposal of Colombia and Switzerland, which was favored by about 45 countries, including Poland. We have besides made certain reservations about the language of the text, but we believe that on the whole that text is acceptable.

[Question] What is the nature of the differences in opinion among individual countries or groups of countries?

[Answer] The basic difference in opinions concerns the validity of measures intended to modify the current text of the General Agreement. The desire for such a modification, due to major changes in the conditions of foreign trade since the formation of the GATT (in 1947), is being resolutely expressed by the United States, the EEC, Japan, and other developed capitalist countries, as well as by some developing countries. But a substantial number of Third World countries champion the view that, above all, the currently binding GATT rules should be adhered to and access to the markets of the industrialized countries should be improved.

[Question] What is Poland's position on this issue?

[Answer] While we share the view that the conditions of world trade have changed significantly, we believe that revisions of GATT rules can be accomplished only on the basis of a multilateral consensus with the participation of all GATT parties. No one can impose anything on anyone.

[Question] One of the more controversial issues is the question of services. Previous GATT meetings were confined to liberalizing commodity trade. Now services also are to be covered by similar procedures.

[Answer] Indeed, this matter is highly controversial. In particular, the United States and Japan are advocating a general agreement assuring the most open possible system of international trade in this field. But the developing countries believe that discussions on the subject of services during the new meeting will divert attention from the as yet unresolved issues concerning the statutory competences of the GATT, and that, above all, GATT discipline in the traditional fields should be strengthened. It appears though that they would be amenable to commencing negotiations on this subject provided that the question of how the ensuing agreements are to be incorporated in the GATT system remains open. Poland occupies a flexible position on this matter.

[Question] In the case of Poland a concession in return for a reduction of tariffs by the countries with market economies was the obligation of an increase in imports from the member countries of GATT. For several years, however, Poland has not been fulfilling this obligation. What does Poland intend to offer in return?

[Question] We aren't fulfilling this obligation because this is not possible in a situation in which the overall volume of world trade has been declining. Another reason for our inability to fulfill this obligation completely is the situation with our balance of payments. But this is in no case a symptom of bad faith. Besides, conversely, we could rather speak of the bad faith of these countries, which continue to refuse credit to us as part of the policy of restrictions, and which impede our access to their markets. As for an eventual change in our formula for participation in GATT, we have already mentioned this repeatedly and linked the matter to the new reform-related economic system in our country. After all, we expect, *inter alia*, a fundamental reform of our customs system and regulation of imports by means of a price-shaping tariff. However, this will take some time.

[Question] So far East-West problems have affected GATT only to a relatively small extent owing to, among other things, the absence of the Soviet Union at that forum. Recently, however, the USSR has expressed interest in participating in the new round.

[Answer] Indeed, on 12 August of this year the Permanent Representative of the USSR at the European Seat of the United Nations in Geneva has directed to the Director General of GATT a letter advising him of the intention of the Soviet Government to participate in the meeting, requesting that the matter be considered by the ministerial session at Punta del Este.

[Question] Do there exist precedents for the participation of a nonmember country in GATT negotiations?

[Answer] Yes, the Tokyo Round was attended by a large group of countries not belonging to GATT. The CEMA countries belonging to GATT favor the conduct of the new round in accordance with the same open formula, which has proved extremely suitable in previous negotiations. We believe that everyone concerned has the right to participate in the present round. This concerns in particular the Soviet Union, which is after all a major participant in international trade.

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CSO: 2600/19

ECONOMY

POLAND

PERSONNEL CHANGES IN FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR

Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 111, 16 Sep 86 p 8

[Unattributed item: "Personnel Changes"]

[Text] Effective 27 June 1986, Zdzislaw Krasinski, born on 17 November 1930 in Poznan was nominated to the post of economic attache - minister plenipotentiary at the Office of Economic Attache at the PRP embassy in Washington. He graduated from the WSE [Higher School of Economics] in Poznan and began his career in 1954. His last position was that of minister in the Office of Prices.

Effective 1 July 1986, Andrzej Paprotny, born in Lodz on 25 January 1925, was nominated to the post of commercial attache at the Office of Commercial Counsellor at the PRP embassy in Lisbon. He graduated from the University of Lodz. He began his career in 1941 and has worked for the Ministry of Foreign Trade since 1960. His last position was that of office manager in the ZPHZ [Association of Foreign Trade Enterprises] Textilimpex in Lodz.

Effective 21 July 1986, Eliasz Nagorski, born in Skieriewice on 2 October 1930, was nominated to the post of commercial attache at the Office of Commercial Counsellor at the PRP embassy in Ulan Bator. He graduated from the University of Warsaw; began his career in 1953. Since 1960, he has been working for the Ministry of Foreign Trade. His last position was that of deputy director of a department in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Effective 31 July 1986, Wlodzimierz Godun, born on 22 April 1935 in Czarna Srednia, was nominated to the post of commercial attache in the Office of Commercial Counsellor at the PRP embassy in Prague. He graduated from the SGPiS [Main School of Planning and Statistics]; began his career in 1954. He has been working for the Ministry of Foreign Trade since 1972. His last position was that of chief specialist in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Effective 1 August 1986, Gabriel Wujek, born on 23 March 1952 in Lodz, was nominated to the post of deputy director in the legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. He graduated from the University of Warsaw; began his career in 1973. Since 1980, he has been working for the Ministry of Foreign Trade. His last position was that of chief specialist in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Effective 4 August, Miroslaw Kowalski, born on 15 January 1949 in Warsaw, was nominated to the post of commercial attache at the Office of Commercial Councillor at the PRP embassy in Sofia. He graduated from the Technical University of Warsaw. He began his career in 1972 at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. His last position was that of senior inspector at PZPR CC.

Effective 11 August 1986, Bohdan Soltan, born on 5 December 1939 in Sochaczew, was nominated to the post of deputy director of the department of economic cooperation with the USSR in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. He graduated from SGPiS; began his career in 1954. He has been working for the Ministry of Foreign Trade since 1963. His last position was that of chief specialist in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

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CSO:2600/17

ECONOMY

POLAND

JAPANESE BUSINESSMAN COMMENTS ON POLISH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 111, 16 Sept 86 p 8

[Article by (s): "Unshaven to the Office"]

[Text] An interview with an anonymous Japanese businessman entitled "Unshaven to the Office" was published in the monthly ZARZADZANIE, 1986, No 8. We are publishing extensive excerpts from this interview which will undoubtedly be of interest to our readers as well.

[Question] Would you please tell us what you think of your Polish partners, our managers. On one occasion, our paper took a survey of them. One of the questions was: do you think you could manage a similar enterprise in a free-market economy.

[Answer] So, what were the answers?

[Question] Over 70 percent responded that yes, they could handle it.

[Answer] That is absurd! If suddenly by a stroke of magic a Polish enterprise were transplanted to the West, it would not survive a week.

[Question] Why this maladjustment? Are Polish managers more stupid than their colleagues in Japan or in the West? I want to remind you that you promised to talk straightforwardly.

[Answer] No, they are not more stupid. I believe that a majority are capable people, but perhaps a little disoriented. My impression is that they do not know what their main objective is... A Japanese company has one objective: profit. Everything is subordinated to it. Meanwhile, the Poles have several objectives, several centers of decision-making, several currency systems. All of this is too ambiguous. I have been working in Poland for several years now and I would not know how to define what it is all about. Quite apart from that, you have many unpredictable circumstances which make it difficult or downright impossible for the manager to operate.

[Question] What do you mean? Deliveries behind schedule, for example?

[Answer] The unpredictable circumstances can be so many that it is difficult to enumerate them. It could be late delivery, power blackout, lack of spare parts, order from the top. However, a manager who has neglected or failed to foresee something always hides easily behind objective difficulties.

[Question] After all, did you not say yourself that those were real rather than imaginary difficulties?

[Answer] So what? Let me give you an example. In my office, the telex broke down. Being without it was like missing a hand. I will not recount for you all of my trips to the telephone company and the post office. I found out that the cables got wet, but hardly anything else - neither the person responsible for drying them out nor when it would be done. It took a week for the telex to be repaired.

[Question] Pardon me, but for us Poles this is no revelation. What is the moral of the story?

[Answer] It is like this: one can excuse his own carelessness, incompetence and a poor system of organization and information and whatever else by these cables getting wet. From the technical point of view, repairs of that kind could have taken a day. The remaining six days is due to human error. That is to say, the difficulties are not necessarily objective.

[Question] Do you think that this is the fault of the system?

[Answer] I would like to avoid such sweeping generalizations, but it is certainly the fault of the organizational system. Here is another example: there is no water in my apartment building and adjacent ones. Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday have gone by, today is Tuesday and there is still no water. One day I ended up going to the office unshaven! In Japan, it would be inconceivable.

[Question] Coming to the office unshaven?

[Answer] That too, but I meant repairs taking so long. Besides, water would be trucked in before the pipes are repaired. However, I am driving at something else: the infrastructure must be rock-solid. Water, communications, energy and transportation cannot struggle along because they support the entirety of economic and social life. Even when they are in private hands, utilities are subject to special state control. In Poland, on the other hand, everything is state property, but somehow is out of control.

[Question] In your opinion, is the work ethic to blame?

[Answer] This is both a cause and a consequence. Infrastructure works poorly because people work poorly. However, people also work poorly because infrastructure operates poorly. Every employee has a thousand excuses because there was no water, the train was late, he had to go to the doctor, he had to stand in line. I have worked in many countries on many continents and I know that development prospects are poor in places where there are plenty of excuses...

[Question] Do you handle exports to Poland and also imports?

[Answer] Both; after all, you cannot trade otherwise with countries with non-convertible currency. In order to sell something, you have to buy something in exchange.

[Question] Is it true that the Poles are not good exporters?

[Answer] It may very well be. We have to look hard for Polish goods which can be sold in the Japanese or some other market. However, the breakdown of our turnover is asymmetrical; imports from Poland account for barely 30 percent. I would very much like to balance our trade and arrive at a 50:50 split.

[Question] Who cares more about exports to Japan - you or your Polish partners?

[Answer] At times I get the impression that they do not care at all. In their unguarded moments, they tell me that everything is easier to sell in the domestic market. Nobody badgers you about quality, deliveries on schedule, packaging and prices are better.

[Question] Export has its bitter as well as sweet side. Isn't that what they are telling you?

[Answer] They say that it would be worthwhile to export in order to get hard currency for the ROD [Retained Hard Currency Earnings Allowances]. However, more and more often they have dollars on paper but cannot get at them. Besides, orders from the top, the plan and political slogans exhort them to export. This is not a very strong motivation.

[Question] What do you think about planning?

[Answer] Planning is necessary. In Japan, we also do planning. We even have a state agency, a Planning Commission of sorts. However, our agency restricts itself to general guidelines.

[Question] This is also the case with our Planning Commission, at least in theory.

[Answer] I don't know about theory, but in practice when I want to increase purchases from a Polish company the response is, maybe in a year, as of now your order is not included in the plan.

[Question] Having mentioned these differences, do you see a future for Polish-Japanese cooperation? Can we be partners?

[Answer] If you are thinking about direct investment from Japan, I doubt it. However, why not in third-country markets? To be sure, we have closer to us attractive partners with an inexhaustible potential, for example, China. With you, it is this constant uncertainty, your surprises. I believe that the turnover can be increased considerably through trade rather than joint projects.

ECONOMY

POLAND

EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK RESOLUTION PUBLISHED

Warsaw MONITOR POLSKI in Polish No 21, 26 Jul 86 p 272

[**"Resolution No 99 of the Council of Ministers of 20 June 1986 on Creating the Export Development Bank"**]

[Text] Pursuant to article 80, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the law of 26 February 1982, the Bank Law (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 7, item 56 and DZIENNIK USTAW, 1983, No 71, item 318), upon consulting the Banking Council, the Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

Article 1. Consent is hereby given for the establishment of a bank called "Export Development Bank, a joint stock company", henceforth referred to as "the bank".

Article 2. The bank operates in the territory of the People's Republic of Poland and abroad. Its headquarters is situated in the capital city of Warsaw.

Article 3. The bank is a hard-currency bank in the meaning of the provisions of the hard-currency law.

Articel 4.1. The bank is organized in the form of a joint stock company with the minister of foreign trade as the founder.

2. The State Treasury represented by the ministers of foreign trade and finance owns 51 percent of the initial capital of the bank whereas the minister of foreign trade in his capacity as founder has a 41 percent share.

3. The National Bank of Poland is a shareholder of the bank; it may own up to 10 percent of its initial capital. Other banks can also be shareholders with a combined ownership of up to 10 percent of the stock.

4. Other units of the socialized economy can also be shareholders of the bank, specifically, state enterprises, companies under trade law in which the share of the State Treasury exceeds 51 percent of the company stock, cooperatives and their unions, mixed enterprises and companies with partly foreign ownership in which the share of Polish holdings is no less than 51 percent of the company stock.

Article 5. Accumulation of zloty and hard currency funds, earmarked for loans or other financing of investment projects by units of the socialized economy aimed at increasing hard currency proceeds or improving the efficiency of export of goods and services, is a basic task of the bank.

Article 6. Accepting deposits and investments, securing loans and managing funds upon request by the minister of foreign trade as well as other main and central organs of state administration, as well as financing and settling accounts in zlotys and hard currency for projects by the units of the socialized economy aimed at increasing hard currency proceeds or improving the efficiency of export of goods and services, fall within the scope of the activities of the bank.

Article 7. The minister of foreign trade in cooperation with the chairman of the National Bank of Poland will ensure the organization and start-up of the operations of the bank before the end of 1983.

Article 8. The resolution takes effect on the day of publication.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Z. Messner

9761
CSO:2600/17

ECONOMY

POLAND

ECONOMIST WILCZYNSKI COMPLAINS HIS VIEWS IGNORED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 39, 27 Sep 86 p 6

[Letter to the Editor by Wacław Wilczynski, Poznań: "'Opinions'"]

[Text] I was amused by Editor Albinowski's "discovery" in PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY, as cited in POLITYKA (No 32). He had reached the conclusion, which is justified anyway, that the cost and profit ingredients of prices, with the profit functioning as a surcharge on cost rather than as the difference between effect and outlay, are a major source of the malaise and non-innovative nature of our economy. of the absence of economic growth, etc.

This "discovery" amuses me because that is what I have been writing about for at least 10 years, with the difference that my writings are published in such "provincial" [quotation marks added -- translator] periodicals as KULTURA ("How to Reduce Our Development Costs," April 1977), NOWE DROGI ("The Operating Method of the Economy and the Conditions for the Application of Cost-Effective Accounting," No 1-2, 1981), ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE ("Do We Have a Mechanism for Achieving Surpluses?" 28 Feb 1982), and more recently EKONOMISTA ("The Polish Economic Reform and the Economic Theory of Socialism," No 4-5, 1985). The inaccessibility of these periodicals was probably a factor.

I'm now waiting for someone to cry Eureka and claim that, in the presence of a ramified system of state subsidies and a market disequilibrium, the adoption of the increase in net sales of output as the basis for wage increases is particularly inflationary. For I made a mistake by discussing this more than 6 years ago in such an unfortunately marginal periodical as GOSPODARKA PLANOWA ("Macroeconomic Criteria for Management and the Aims of the Enterprise," No 2, 1980).

All this, taken together, illustrates the axiom that it is not enough to be in the right. What matters most is when one's rationale is publicized and by whom....

Economists have probably said everything they ought say, but they were not and are not the kind of economists who are willingly listened to. The conceptual and decisionmaking impasse in which the Polish economic policy exists is a

signal that it his high time to stop hiding one's head in the sand and to begin to learn economics, and also to cease pretending that nothing bad is happening....

1386

CSO: 2600/19

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF TOPICAL ISSUES

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Sep 86 p 3

[Interview by Jindra Cekalova, Jiri Janouskovec, and Ladislav Kapek: "Face to Face with Our Readers"]

[Excerpts] On the occasion of the Day of the Press, Radio and Television on Sunday, 21 September, a traditional meeting of the readers and editors of RUDE PRAVO took place in the Julius Fucik Culture and Amusement Park in Prague. Jaroslav Kojzar, deputy editor-in-chief of RUDE PRAVO; Svatopluk Smutny, manager of the party's economic and social policies department; Jarmila Houfova, RUDE PRAVO correspondent; Jan Lipavsky, manager of the HALO SOBOTA supplement; Ivo Urban, manager of the physical culture and sports section; Zdena Bakesova, deputy manager of the workers' letters section; Frantisek Cinger, deputy manager of the cultural section; Jaroslav Michalek, deputy manager of the regional correspondents department, and Milan Jelinek, deputy manager of the foreign affairs section, answered numerous questions posed face-to-face by the readers. Their questions varied and covered diverse areas. We selected a sampling of questions and answers which will certainly interest other readers.

[Question] How should I understand the term "restructuring" of the USSR's national economy?

Kojzar: These essential steps in the life of the whole Soviet society are taken in response to the 27th Congress of the CPSU. The purpose of this particular strategy is to accelerate the USSR socioeconomic development in every area of its social life. Its economic measures are designed to introduce the achievements of the R&D revolution; the system and methods of management are being revised in order to achieve comprehensive, genuine participation of working people in the administration of all affairs related to production.

We are following this process with great interest. The decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU were also reflected in our strategic policies for the accelerated socioeconomic development of our society, adopted by our party's 17th Congress.

[Question] What will be this year's achievement for our agriculture?

Smutny: Every year is considerably different. Last year and the year before were most auspicious for our cultivation of grain crops. Those two harvests were the best in the history of our agriculture. The weather this year was less favorable and in many of our grain-producing areas the crops turned dry and the yield was low. In spite of that, the grain harvested this year still exceeded the average yield over the past 5-year period. There can be no doubt that our people's food supply will be adequate. Moreover, we have set aside some of the surplus from our two bumper harvests in our state storage. The situation of our fodder base looks more bleak. Grain fodder, which plays an important role, will be in short supply. Some agricultural cooperatives may feel the pinch. This calls for rational use of grain if the planned livestock production is to be achieved. I repeat--there is no reason to fear shortages of bread, meat, milk, eggs, and so on.

[Question] In September our representatives visited several foreign countries. What is the objective of such activities in our state's foreign policy?

Jelinek: In this restless world we are seeking allies and partners for negotiations and particularly for peaceful cooperation in preventing the threat of a nuclear war. Personal contacts of representatives of various states are increasing in accordance with the spirit of our time and with the struggle for enforcement of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The answer to your question has an economic level as well. Why? Because no state can exist all by itself. Many of the political, economic and, ecological problems before us and before other states, no matter what their social system, cannot be resolved by us alone, but only in cooperation with others.

[Question] According to the statewide program for the development and protection of the environment, the CSSR will not achieve an ecological balance until after the year 2000. Is this date not too distant? We may be overly optimistic if we think that in 14 years we shall be able to improve substantially the environment throughout our state?

Michalek: It is true that a state program for environmental conservation and development has been drafted. Its implementation is divided into 4 stages. The first covers the period of the Eighth 5-Year Plan when the deterioration of our environment will be arrested, especially in the most endangered areas--in Prague and in the North Bohemia kraj. The second stage is set for 1990-1995. Its aim is to bring about partial improvement of the environment. For example, air pollution will be cut by at least 30 percent. The third stage will end in the year 2000 when the environment of our entire territory will be substantially improved; in subsequent years--in other words, during the fourth stage--we shall achieve the already mentioned ecological balance. Of course, that objective should be achieved at an earlier date because it would benefit all of us; however, we must realize that implementation of this program will require funds amounting to many billions of Kcs before the end of this century. But this is not a question of funds alone. It will be necessary to set up construction facilities, to manufacture the necessary technology, to train experts, etc. because extensive trends in many branches of our national economy in the past period led to considerable environmental deterioration in our country. Consequently, the rate at which we shall intensify our national economy will also be of major importance. [...]

[Question] How do you handle those letters from your readers which criticize RUDE PRAVO?

Bakesova: We are most appreciative of every suggestion and every recommendation, even the critical ones. Our editorial board discusses in detail letters which criticize the format or the contents of RUDE PRAVO and then draws appropriate conclusions. If it turns out that some error was caused by one of our editors or any other person involved in the publication of our daily, that individual may be made to pay a fine.

[Question] How many anonymous letters do you receive?

Lipavsky: There may be about 10 among several hundred letters addressed to the Word of the Workers column. That is a significant political factor. People show their trust in us. They are not afraid to sign their full names and we try not to disappoint them.

[Question] Why do we spend so much for arms if we are so afraid of them?

Jelinek: I would restate your question this way: why do we need arms? You cannot blame the socialist state for manufacturing weapons. As a matter of fact, it is highly unprofitable to manufacture arms; it is a waste of materials and manpower and, in particular, the most precious materials and the most skilled work forces. For that reason all proposals made by the socialist countries have one goal: let us get rid of arms. We really do not need them, but so long as the external threat continues--and that is the threat posed by the aggressive NATO configuration led by the USA--we must have arms because we must be able to defend our revolution.

[...]

[Question] Should we still regard Ivan Lendl as our tennis player?

Urban: Ivan Lendl is a Czechoslovak citizen. The name of Czechoslovakia appears next to his name on the neon-lit marquees of international matches. However, as we often read in Lendl's interviews in foreign press, this tennis player unfortunately does not always act in a manner fit for a citizen and representative of our republic.

Kojzar: Some of you may have read in the TRIBUNA weekly part of an interview which Ivan Lendl gave some time ago to the West German journal DER SPIEGEL. The overwhelming majority of readers who reacted expressed their opinions to TRIBUNA harshly condemned his peculiar conception of homeland. Alas, he gave other interviews of the same kind.

[Question] What is the reason for the opening of Eso stores in our country?

Smutny: Eso stores mostly offer foreign goods and certain specialties of our production. Previously, such goods used to be divided among all grocery stores, each of them receiving only small quantities. Therefore, the authorities in charge decided that such goods should be sold by a special retail chain to make them accessible to all interested customers, and thus, the Eso chain was organized. Its prices are comparable to foreign prices and to the costs for importing such products. They are not basic necessities; they are variety and luxury items and for that reason they also cost more.

[...]

[Question] I think that our public lacks adequate information. Sometimes we get reports from the foreign media before we get them from our own communications, and that is not right.

Houfova: I think that this is changing slowly but surely. The premise that nothing--no disaster or accident--can happen in our country no longer applies. Information must be really as prompt as possible, flexible, and naturally, truthful. That prevents all kinds of rumors.

Kojzar: Lately we have been really reacting to some developments far more flexibly and promptly or, at least, we have tried to do so. Occasionally our efforts may have missed the mark, but we are as aware of such blind spots as we are of our duty to get rid of them.

[Question] How did the singer Matuska explain his emigration to the media in the West?

Cinger: Waldemar Matuska asked for political asylum in the USA and shortly afterwards he was interviewed on several occasions, particularly by the Voices of America and Radio Free Europe. There he mentioned that the reason for his emigration was the fact that in our republic he could not sing what he wanted and could not entertain the public as he wanted. What can we add to that? Nobody has given Matuska commands about how and what to sing. I should like to mention that we have received many letters from our readers who, as citizens of our country, feel deeply hurt and insulted by his decision.

Kojzar: In one of his interviews Waldemar Matuska declared that in the CSSR he lacked the freedom to sing and the "space" to develop all his artistic talents. In his subsequent interviews he repeated that after one of his concerts some time ago an unknown citizen from Ceske Budejovice had complained about Matuska's unbecoming appearance. For that Matuska was investigated by the [National] Security and called to a hearing at the Ministry of Culture. He said that he was threatened with a 6-month suspension. That is not true.

[Question] What specifically are the results of the Word of the Workers column and how are they assessed in the HALO SOBOTA supplement?

Lipavsky: We must underscore the fact that the authors of the contributions to the column The Word of the Workers express their confidence in us, which for us means a compliment as well as an obligation. Our intention was to begin a dialogue between the reader and the journalist because both are partners co-creating our newspaper. The Word of the Workers has shown that such a dialogue is possible. We are rooting for socially involved citizens. We tried to eliminate commonplace cliches and to give the critique a concrete form. The editors of RUDE PRAVO, in cooperation with appropriate party and trade-union organizations and officials, follow up critical letters which blow the whistle on certain shortcomings in our society. We are trying to resolve such problems by joint actions.

[Question] How many correspondents does RUDE PRAVO have?

Bakesova: There are about 200 correspondents on our rolls. Naturally, they do not write every day. They live and work in various parts of our republic. Our greatest wish is to expand their ranks and to improve their quality.

[Question] It seems to me that the media's criticism of shortcomings still has no teeth. With some exceptions in RUDE PRAVO and TRIBUNA, it is not specific. Why can you not follow the example of the Soviet press more?

Houfova: I believe that all of us are concerned about the way we can help our press to fulfill the tasks facing our society. The answer is: follow the Leninist style of work. Integral to it is an uncompromising, committed and well-informed approach from the top down and the bottom up. Those are the principles which guide the Soviet press. Those are the principles which also guide our press. More exactly, we are learning how to apply them in our work. After all, it is no secret that it was precisely the 27th Congress of Soviet communists which strongly influenced our 17th Congress. We adopted correct decisions. I do not expect that all of them will be translated into reality all at once and, so to say, painlessly. We are struggling for them and will probably struggle for them for some time to come because there are now and will in the future be certain people in our country who cannot get used to the new style of work; in fact, our comrades in the USSR are coping with similar problems, as Comrade Gorbachov mentioned on countless occasions. That new style of work demand, from our people considerable political and professional skills and personal qualities. The very concept of the strategy for accelerated development of our society--the goals we are setting up for ourselves--call for vigorous work and responsibility.

I agree that we still have many untapped resources, let us say, for the creation of such a climate in every organization where we all shall regard criticism as a matter of fact and where we shall not crave any sensations. Criticism and self-criticism are among the principles of the Leninist style of work.

The time for applause is over; hard work is needed, even in our country; if we wish to accelerate our socioeconomic development, we have no other choice. [...]

9004/9869
CSO: 2400/11

POLITICS

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG STUDY PROBES SED READINESS TO APE CPSU REFORMS

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Vol 19 No 9, Sep 86 (signed to press
25 Aug 86) pp 967-988

[Article by Dr Walter Suess, member of the research staff in the department of GDR Research and Archives in the Central Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the Free University of Berlin: "Not a Model for the GDR? — Soviet Reform Efforts As Viewed by the SED"]

[Text] 1. Sign of a Revaluation

Hans-Dieter Schuett, editor-in-chief of the FDJ paper JUNGE WELT, said in a ZEIT interview: "To me the Soviet Union has claim to historic merits because it beat Hitler and won the war, but in technology and progress it is no model to us."¹

This almost laconic remark signals a profound change in the SED's sense of identity in as much as it is governed by the focus on the "fatherland of socialism." Certainly, SED comrades might on occasion have argued like it in the past--in private. They would not likely have expressed themselves that way to a journalist from the other Germany. In such, rather formal, meetings, one would have expected paraphrases like the following one of 1973: "The leadership role of the Soviet Union and of the CPSU keeps growing inevitably. Under its leadership the peoples of the Soviet Union as the first ones in the world are proceeding along communist construction and thereby are making the decisive (...) contribution to the further progress of humanity."²

In this form or similarly any even semi-official definition of the relationship with the Soviet Union as the "pioneer of the progress of humanity"³ would have been made up to a few years ago. Today it no longer seems to be so.

As to the remark quoted above, it may be of some importance that Schuett, born in 1948, is a child of that postwar generation that may at best understand the slogan, "Learning from the Soviet Union Means Learning to Win!" still as a historic lesson. And so his assessment reads more like a sober account by a son who certainly admits his father's merits but now thinks he stands on his own feet. And yet one should not overemphasize the generational aspect, despite all the importance it undoubtedly has. At most by way of his unadorned way of expression Schuett contradicts his party executive, but not in the substance of his argumentation. That is to say, the Soviet Union is no longer perceived as the one-and-only embodiment of social progress. Thereby, however, vanishes its orienting function for the further development of one's own system.

Since the 11th party congress in April this year at the latest, the development of more "independence"⁴ by the SED has been in evidence. This process is likely to have something to do with the policy of the new CPSU leadership under Gorbachev and the specific differences the SED perceives to it. That such differences could fairly openly come to the fore, however, for that the foundations were laid already in the 1960's and 1970's, not last by Soviet policy itself. The changes within the perimeter of the GDR in those years and the SED's specific reaction to them should therefore, as an introduction, be briefly recapitulated.

The decisive foreign policy change for the GDR, starting in the mid-1960's, did not primarily pertain to its relationship with the USSR, but to the re-assessment of its relationship with the FRG.⁵ Up to then, to ensure its own stability, it had engaged in a policy of demarkation from the other German state and of self-isolation, which found its most dismal expression in the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. This demarkation policy now came under pressure from two sides: from the West and from the East. The FRG came to realize that the "GDR phenomenon" could no longer be eliminated by outside pressure or isolation. The front of those who opposed its recognition crumbled, and now came a growing readiness to take a step toward the SED.⁶ On the other side, the Soviet leadership was not willing to have a revamping of its Western policy permanently blocked by separate GDR interests. It pressed the SED to make its contribution to the detente policy even without having its maximum demands satisfied⁷ although the risks of such a policy to the internal stability of the GDR system, still ailing about legitimization deficits, were hard to calculate. The various stages of this complicated process of change cannot be traced at this point. The somewhat surprising result was that the SED now learned to perceive as a factor of higher stability the very relationship that had appeared to it as the main source of instability in the 1950's and 1960's, the relationship with the FRG as the other German state. This learning process held up so much that even when in 1984 the USSR temporarily switched to stronger confrontation in its Western policy (to retaliate for the beginning deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe), the SED leadership held on to its policy of German-German detente and even risked a slight conflict with the Soviet leadership over it.⁸ This conflict did not attack the substance of the alliance. The USSR is and remains the "power that guarantees real socialism" in the GDR against domestic and external provocations, and the SED continues to design its policy on the foundation and within the framework of the "socialist community." Yet it does document a shift in the prevailing situation of interests. Meanwhile the "junior partner GDR" can represent its interests, not only reactively and through blocking as in the late 1960's during the issues taken over the detente policy, but now even actively, acting at some degree of independence in the international political arena. The changed foreign policy constellation in the late 1960's and early 1970's also modified SED domestic policy. To prevent the destabilizing effect of close contacts between GDR citizens and visitors from a country with a much higher consumption level, who furthermore were citizens of the same nation, considerable economic policy efforts were undertaken (along with the attempt to curtail or even bar contacts with specific population groups). Under the slogan of a "unity of economic and social policy," announced by the eighth party congress in 1971, a number of

sociopolitical measures and a comprehensive housing construction program were proclaimed.¹⁰ To be able to finance such a policy, the GDR's economic efficiency had to be boosted. Through a closer link between science and production, indirect steering mechanisms within the scope of a centralized basic structure of the economy, and institutional changes, the most essential element of it being the reforming of the combines, that did succeed in fact to a considerable degree--more so in any event than in all other East or Southeast European states.

This successful coping with a double challenge, the change in the GDR's international frame of reference by opening up to the West and the end of pacifying its own population through strict isolation, had to be of consequence to the SED's sense of identity. Honecker's contention at the 11th party congress, that in the GDR one is living now under "world-open terms,"¹¹ is a rather bold exaggeration, to be sure, of the results of that policy, though the SED has undoubtedly gained more elbow room by it. As the SED's reception of the Soviet reform process demonstrates, that elbow room with its corresponding higher sense of identity now serves to screening off domestically vis-a-vis the CPSU.

2. Principles Behind the Soviet Reform Process

To analyze the SED's defense tactics against the "Soviet challenge," one must define the substance of it. That can only be done in outline form within the scope of this article.¹²

The starting point for the current reform policy lay in the growing problem pressure by which the Soviet leadership found itself confronted in the late 1970's:

- Stagnation of farm production and shrinking growth rates in industry;¹³
- a labor productivity far below the level of capitalist countries¹⁴ and increased capital expenditures per production units in new investments;¹⁵
- the impression to be missing the connection with the microelectronics revolution;¹⁶
- a low and ever more slowly rising standard of living;¹⁷
- expanding corruption, and so forth.¹⁸

All this in view of crisis manifestations even in several "fraternal states"¹⁹ and an aggravated world political situation.

In coping with these problems one can identify at least three political trends which in part pick up positions and confrontations of the 1950's and 1960's,²⁰ some even of the 1920's:²¹

- Adherents to the status quo who want to change nothing essential and who have long been known already in Western literature²² and now also in the Soviet Union as "conservatives";
- those to whom the changes since the early 1950's have already gone too far and who seek the solution in recourse to the values and structures of the 1930's and 1940's, the "traditionalists";²³
- and finally a heterogenous and relatively broad group of "modernizers" or "reformers."

The second group, the traditionalists, is likely to have been eliminated prior to the 27th congress already. Its most influential spokesman probably, the

editor-in-chief of the theoretical party organ KOMMUNIST, Richard Kosolapov, was removed from the editorial board and lost his seat in the Central Committee. Its conception plays no role anymore; which does not mean, however, that the values they held high had now lost their importance in the Soviet Union. There remain the other groups, "conservatives" and "reformers," whose smallest common denominator is the transition to production intensification. Already at the 26th CPSU Congress, which came at the beginning of that era to which one finds today almost none but negative references in the Soviet Union,²⁴ Brezhnev had asserted in his "status report": "Also the so-called extensive growth factors of the economy keep getting more and more limited. (...) The most important we have to concentrate on thus is increased production efficiency."²⁵

Too little, however, was done--looked at from today's vantage point--to convert that knowledge into deeds.²⁶ In the issue-taking over it the first directional decision was made by choosing Yuri Andropov as successor to Leonid Brezhnev who had died in November 1982.¹⁷ How much the former KGB boss favored the reform is hard to make out ex post facto; his tenure as general secretary was too brief for it and his utterances were too contradictory too. On the one side he asked for a "transformation of the economic mechanism," on the other side he warned: "These measures must be carefully prepared and must be realistic."²⁸ On the one hand he demanded "taking accurate account of personal and local interests and specific needs of social groups," because "an idea always makes a fool of itself when set apart from 'interest.'"¹⁸ (Marx) On the other hand, a basic feature of his official style was the moral appeal and behavioral correctives through police measures,²⁹ a policy that is which one should rather have to call "traditionalist."

This inconsistency probably also reflected the obscurity of the power relations among the three trends referred to above in the Politburo, which came into the open when after Andropov's death in February 1983 Konstantin Chernenko, a compromise candidate, became the new general secretary. His essential contribution to the reform trend consisted in that he, though by origin entirely a typical "conservative," put a brake on the reform process, to be sure, but without throwing the oars back into a restoration policy.

By choosing Gorbachev to be Chernenko's successor as general secretary then, in personnel policy the die had finally be cast in favor of a reform policy in March 1985. At the Central Committee plenum held a good month later, the "April Plenum," Gorbachev, in a speech in preparation of the 27th congress, already sought to nail down the principles of his policy to come.³⁰ That he then still ran into some difficulties is shown, e.g., by the fact that the key concept in Gorbachev's policy, "the acceleration of socioeconomic development," was, to be sure, turned ex post facto into a part of official party doctrine by this plenum,³¹ though it was still missing in the resolution the Central Committee had issued on the party congress and this plenum had ratified.³²

The decision of principle in the spring of 1985 was to end the interregnum and to attempt a reform policy line for the party. How consistently this line was to be pursued, however, was not--and has not yet been--settled, let alone the operationalization and practical orchestration of this conception. To avoid misunderstandings, a qualifying remark should first be offered here: If one of the three different trends referred to above called the adherents of the

status quo was named conservatives, one must not think of them as a faction or something like that. The strength of that trend lies in the functional logic of the inherited institutions, the interests intertwined with them, and the inertia of ingrained habits. Its representatives need not absolutely have a program. They can design their policy just as well "under the aegis of the 27th party congress resolutions" as of those of any other previous party congresses--as long as slogans spawn no deeds. From that another point follows: The real basic conflict in the Soviet Union today is the one between this conservatism, which likely pervades all strata of Soviet society, and the attempts at bringing a dynamism into and changing that society. Primarily it takes place not in big program debates, but within ordinary life. The program debates, with which we shall have to deal in the following, must thus be interpreted as more or less serious attempts at facing this conflict and dealing with it in such a way that it will release reform impulses.

On the central level the immediate result of the "victory" by the backers of reform (nailed down mainly in personnel policy decisions) was that their own intrinsic differentiations came into the open more clearly. Though not openly contested, these differences had become boundless at the 27th CPSU Congress. Key points were then and are the reform handle and the subject and object of the reform.

a) The Reform Handle

The demand for an "intensification" of economic development is nothing new in the Soviet Union--as already mentioned. And specific changes in the economic mechanism have also time and again been made since the mid-1960's. The crucial new point in Gorbachev's conception is that he wants to buttress the economic reform by measures in social reform. The key term of this conception, the "acceleration of socioeconomic development," by itself, is as vague as "intensification" or "perfection." Decisive is how this concept is defined. On that Gorbachev affirmed in his status report at the party congress:

"The course at acceleration does not confine itself to changes in the economic sphere. It provides for an active social policy to be undertaken and for the principle of socialist justice to be enforced rigorously. The acceleration strategy presupposes the perfecting of social relations, a revitalization of the forms and methods in the efforts of the political and ideological institutions, a deepening of socialist democracy and a resolute surmounting of inertia, stagnation, and conservatism, i.e., of all that which blocks social progress."³³

The counter-position to this handle is found, not in coming out against the "acceleration," but in trying to confine it to the economic sector. An example of it was furnished at the congress by V. V. Shcherbitskiy, a Brezhnev protege, member of the CPSU Politburo since 1971 and, since 1972, first secretary of the Ukrainian CP, who in spite of fierce criticism of his policy in the period before the 27th congress, was surprisingly reconfirmed in his office.

In his statement from the floor³⁴ he too spoke about the "acceleration effort," if not--like Gorbachev--in "socioeconomic" but "scientific-technical progress." In explaining that concept he confined himself to the "saving of material and

energy," the "trimming of prime costs and the capital assets intensity," and similar, purely economic, matters. In contrast to him it was, say, V. I. Vorotnikov, prime minister of the RSFSR, whose career had gotten started under Andropov,³⁵ who pointed out in his contribution from the floor that the "dialectical connection between the economy, the social sphere, and culture" was an essential feature of the "acceleration strategy."³⁶

That much for the first field of conflict: a more narrow or a broader reform handle, a purely economic and at the same time also a political and cultural reform. In this context we remind our readers that the experiences of the last 2 years have sufficiently demonstrated that with a narrow reform handle that is confined to the economic mechanism gradual improvements are possible at best, but that historic turning point postulated at the 27th congress is not.

b) The Subject of Reform

All discussion speakers take for granted that the decisive subject of the reform is the party (and to some extent the state organs). Nor will as committed a reformer as Gorbachev himself³⁷ or the new Moscow party boss Yeltsin touch that taboo. Quite on the contrary they precisely are the ones who deplore that "the party organs (...) have at times forfeited their functions as political leadership organs."³⁸ The political differentiation--in conformity with the disparate reform handles--starts when the subject of reform is expanded beyond the party (and the state organs). None of it is sensed, say, in A. A. Gromyko's party speech. In a downright classic paternalistic manner, he put it like this: "When the party is preparing its future plans, it is mobilizing its capacities, its energy, its understanding and experiences, to make the life of the people still more beautiful."³⁹

The impulses for further development Gromyko refers to before the delegates assembled in "our revolutionary sanctuary, the Kremlin"⁴⁰ are traditions and moral virtues: allegiance "to our home, to the ideals of communism, to the ideals of the older generation"; "nobility, clear understanding, a healthy spirit and a healthy body."⁴¹

Gorbachev also attributes an essential role to the moral appeal,⁴² yet he does not stop there. Rather, he demands paying greater attention to the interests of groups and individuals:

"A policy brings the desired results if it is based on precise attention to the interests of the classes, the social groups, and the individual. (...) Society--that is concrete people, concrete interests, their joys and their dramas, who have their own views of life and its real and presumed values."⁴³

That social concept is far removed from the normally subsumed "political-ideological unity of the Soviet people,"⁴⁴ as by KGB chairman Chebrikov, for instance. As a political demand, its meaning is no longer purely paternalistic. It also involves more intrinsically social initiative--within the framework of the system, of course. Gorbachev alluded to that even before he became general secretary: "Perfecting developed socialism ultimately is a matter of expanding the opportunities for the development of the individual, for the initiative of Soviet man."⁴⁵

That could just be more ideological phrases, were they not placed in the context of a conception that means to open up somewhat the extant institutions toward society--particularly toward the intelligentsia. "Publicity" (glasnost) is the key term there. It is as much the subject as the medium for paying more attention to social demands. Gorbachev does not intend either certainly to release its instruments (newspapers and magazines, the literature enterprise, theaters, films and so forth) from party controls. For all that it could be therefore an attempt at squaring the circle. Still, it cannot be precluded from the outset that this way there could also be opened up the chance for a spiral of more of a societal initiative and less state and party regimentation. That is suggested, for one thing, by a few practical steps having already been taken in that direction.⁴⁶ And then also, this demand for more publicity also, from Gorbachev's vantage point, amounts to a basic prerequisite for a successful reform policy:

"Expanding publicity to us amounts to a matter of principle. This is a political question. There is no democratism, political mass creativity, or mass participation in management and there can be none of it without publicity. That is (...) the starting point for psychologically reorienting our cadre."⁴⁷

That it is more than a new slogan is also suggested by the fact that opposing forces are already stirring. At the party congress itself, spokesmen for such criticism were the second man in the party, Igor Ligachov, the chief-of-state Gromyko, and KGB boss Chebrikov, quite a respectable opposition.⁴⁸ It ought to be noted that the inadequacy of Soviet information policy after the Chernobyl disaster is not likely to be adequate proof for the new course having already foundered and the traditional restrictive forces having had their way for good.⁴⁹ It also is true with regard to the reform subject that the issues taken on the upper echelon of the system are only a reflection of what is taking place within society itself. Attempts to put a brake on the process from the top could easily stop it from getting started to begin with. The official *IZVESTIYA* illuminated the ambivalence of the average Soviet citizen about the publicity campaign by recording a conversation, likely to be fictitious, around a newspaper stand. A Soviet citizen comments in speaking to a journalist on the demand for a more public commitment by saying: "You journalists are sometimes encouraging the people or, I may say, are appealing to them they should boldly take up the struggle against the bureaucrats and functionaries, small tyrants as they are, and that is what they then do, and then we find out that such brave people 'were retired' or got into all sorts of difficulties. It turns out you egged them on to fight a bear with a fork."⁵⁰

If "publicity" is the attempt to make a critical commitment fruitful for making, precisely, the middle-functionaries' level more efficient, and the party more dynamic, on the industrial level it means an expansion of the participatory opportunities.⁵¹ In his party congress speech Gorbachev has made two concrete suggestions about it: establishing "work collective councils" which as a permanent institution are to exercise a sort of codetermination on the operations level and a change toward making the lower enterprise managements eligible for elections up to the department chief level.⁵²

As the existing structures, in particular the inviolability of the "party's leadership role,"⁵³ is the unquestionable premise for all reform policy, all political orientations have to come from a functional, and not from an emancipatory, concept of social participation. But once social conservatism has been punctured at some spots, a newly arising commitment may spawn a dynamism of its own. Disagreement within the political leadership show up in the question whether such a "risk" should or has to be taken or not. What one is afraid of became clear, for instance, through Ligachov's criticism of the PRAVDA editorial board. He disliked that there, in a letter to the editor, the social privileges of the leadership stratum had been attacked.⁵⁴

In view of the widespread skepticism about the reform course, any constraint of "glasnost," however qualified, might well mean that nothing will change at all.

c) Reform Objects

Viewed from that aspect also one again finds a number of common features which overlap. Favorite objects of criticism are such subsumed categories as bureaucratism, conservatism, and parochialism. As long as they are treated as characteristics of particular persons, it means nothing in terms of reform policy.⁵⁵ When it came to specific institutions referred to in such a critical intent, it pertained mainly to the ministries with economic functions. So Gorbachev said: "The time has come to end the practice of petty tutelage over the enterprises by ministries and official authorities."⁵⁶

As in the Soviet Union there still is the separation between party and state, criticism like that, when uttered during a party congress, may also suggest a self-justification by the party. Moreover, that surely is not a novel topic. Even Kosygin, e.g., in his speech on economic policy at the 24th party congress in 1971 remarked: "We find that some ministries still apply insufficiently the new production management methods. Not so rarely are the rights of the enterprises that derive from economic cost accounting curtailed and are economic methods replaced by administrative ones."⁵⁷

The matter becomes politically explosive when one departs from these trodden paths and refers to that institution which in this system ultimately bears the political responsibility in its sense of identity, and that is the party. It was a hot iron Gorbachov took in hand there: "For some years the practical acts by the party and state organs lagged behind the requirements of the age, the requirements of life itself, and not only because of objective factors, but mainly subjective ones."⁵⁸

That could only refer to the central party leadership. Boris Yeltsin became more direct still when he, with reference to the corruption scandals in the southern Soviet Union, asked: "Did really no one notice in the CPSU Central Committee, what things were heading for in Uzbekistan, the Kirghiz SSR, in some regions and cities where, frankly speaking, it came down to a degeneration of the cadre?"⁵⁹

From it he derived the demand to "change the structure of the Central Committee apparatus totally." Though he got "persistent applause" for it from the delegates,⁶⁰ that point was not picked up in the party congress resolutions.

Relative to the reform object the differences then are reflected in the extent to which the party turns itself into an object of criticism. In line with the differentiation introduced between the narrower and broader reform handle, one should have to add--which for reasons of space we could not deal with--the criticism of work done by non-economic institutions, especially in the cultural sector.

This sketch of the Soviet reform process was needed as a foil against which to hold the selective reception afforded it by the SED.

3. The Reception by the SED

DER SPIEGEL asked the former Stoph advisor Hermann von Berg: "You believe the leeway (of the GDR vis-a-vis the USSR) is larger than what Honecker uses of it?" His answer: "Of course. But the present SED leadership is so much tied to the Soviet Union, in terms of ideology, it is the Promised Land."⁶¹

The first half of the argumentation is likely to be correct: The SED has more elbow room meanwhile. What does not apply, it seems to me, is the assumption that it is not using this elbow room for reform policy because it is fixating on the "Promised Land." Sure enough, there has been and there is such a fixation, especially among senior comrades, but still higher than that is their interest in stability in their country, and this very interest appears to prohibit the current SED leadership from joining the latest Soviet change of course. Regardless of whether or not the SED finds that the Soviet Union has the need to catch up through a modernization policy, its objective in its own country is to conserve the accomplishments of the 1970's and 1980's. Joachim Herrmann, Central Committee secretary for agitprop, has summarized those accomplishments as follows: "Our GDR has grown into a politically stable and economically efficient state which enjoys high respect all over the world."⁶²

This does summarize the essential goals of the system: Stability, i.e. unaltered preservation of the power structures, prosperity, prestige, the two latter goals being such that they can nicely be coordinated with the first one. Where in this image would one then find a need for "radical reforms?"

No surprise then that the SED leadership has been most cautious in coming close to the Soviet reform process. The basic processing model for this process became clear as early as in the spring of last year. The "fresh breeze" the Georgian Central Committee secretary Patashvili felt after the CPSU Central Committee plenum of April 1985 did not quite blow into East Berlin.⁶³ Readers of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND relying exclusively on that source of information after reading the edition of 24 April 1985 could hardly have had the impression that the CPSU Central Committee plenum reported on there had been of any historic significance. Gorbachev's speech was reported in such a way as if nothing essential had changed. Four columns was all the report got, and two thirds of it reiterated well-known foreign policy positions, with the last third alone given over to domestic policy.⁶⁴ The reverse had been true of the speech itself: The first two thirds dealt with domestic policy and only the last third with foreign policy issues.⁶⁵ And that made more sense, too. After all, by his speech Gorbachev sought to commit the party to his own line in the pre-congress period, and that amounted mainly to domestic policy problems. The key term--as already mentioned--being the "acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the country."⁶⁶

This term occurs six times in the speech; in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND one will look for it in vain. In view of the fact that for GDR journalism political "formulas (...) authoritatively express a given status achieved in any specific fields of the political struggle or the demand conforming to any given situation,"⁶⁷ such manner of "overlooking" a central concept can only be understood as an act of taking distance. Evidently, from the reporter's viewpoint, this formula did not suit "the situation." That impression is deepened when one looks at the detail. Much of what Gorbachev said took issue with the policy of his predecessors and was devoted to topical problems of the Soviet system: "in recent years unfavorable tendencies (had) grown stronger, and not a few difficulties (had) arisen," however, "starting in 1983" (i.e. with Andropov's tenure) one had "managed to improve the situation somewhat."⁶⁸ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND turns that into "The speaker called attention to difficulties."

Any time-reference is lacking and so is any comment that in Gorbachev's view it was simply not just a matter of "difficulties" (where would there be none?), but "tendencies" in social and political development.

How does the SED central organ present the policy Gorbachev intends to oppose it by? The "acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the country" is treated in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND only under a partial aspect of the "acceleration of the scientific-technical progress." This narrowing, which can also be found in the Soviet debate, conforms to the foreshortened portrayal of the total conception as technical or economic projects, whereas, e.g., the importance Gorbachev attributed also in this speech of his to the mass media, remains unmentioned.

A special chapter in Gorbachev's speech then still was the cadre policy. As this plenum opened the election campaign for the next party congress, this point was bound to have considerable weight: "While status reports are presented and during the elections the leading party organs have to be formed and staffed with fresh manpower, and cadre issues that have matured must be resolved."⁶⁹

In connection with his criticism of the "pensioners' mentality,"⁷⁰ "at the base" and of "lack of self-criticism" in "ministries and other official authorities,"⁷¹ this evidently points to more of a cadre change. Yet Gorbachev does suggest there are differences of opinion about this point in the political leadership. By way of noticeable distance, he reports: "The Politburo deems it important, as a matter of principle, to carry on the line of party leadership stability, of the correct proportion between experienced and fresh cadre." And then he adds: "But that must not go hand in hand with any sort of stagnation in the cadre movement."

How is that to be prevented, seeing that the new general secretary also has to rely on the current majorities in his stability-devoted Politburo? According to NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Gorbachev had come up with something that is almost as old as the Soviet system itself: "More boldly one should have to assign women and young cadre capable of development to responsible functions."

This may be a suitable means for upgrading the medium-level and full-time staff of the cadre, yet it does not pertain, or only pertains over a very long haul, to the power center, the "party leadership." Its composition it was, however, that Gorbachev had to change noticeably still before the party congress if he wanted

to make his policy prevail. Different from the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND version, he therefore continues his speech by introducing to his argumentation another subject in addition to the "Politburo": "In letters sent to the Central Committee communists are pointing out that some managers holding on to positions over a long time often stop recognizing innovations and get used to deficiencies."

This sentence is missing in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and so is the inference he is drawing from it and which simply is not identical with his conception of the Politburo for which he was quoted before: "One must give thought to it and seek ways for more active movement among our leadership cadre."

Whereas Gorbachev then suggests a conflict within the Politburo about the future cadre policy and does not go easy on the composition of this top party body, appeals to critical party members and promises them advances in conjunction with this conflict, in the way NEUES DEUTSCHLAND has reported it Gorbachev turns into a younger Brezhnev: He becomes a politician who disguises conflicting interests by general phraseology, demanding "stability" without wanting any "standstill," putting "experienced cadre" at ease while holding out hope for the "young cadre capable of development." The outcome of such a policy could only be a cementing of the status quo.

The rationale behind the SED's tendentious information policy in this early stage was to disguise any signs of a break in the continuity in the Soviet development. That obviated the need to devalue ex post facto its own previous encomiums on the now vehemently attacked Brezhnev policy, and it made possible postponing an answer to the question whether the CPSU change in course would have to have an impact also on SED policy. All too long, for that matter, this line could not be sustained. At least as to the fact of a change of course on the CPSU top level, a revision soon would have to be made in the SED's information policy. When the decision was made about that, we do not know. Possibly during or shortly after Erich Honecker's "friendship visit" to Gorbachev on 5 May 1985.⁷³

In any case, they did report in the greatest detail, at unaccustomed length, on a conference on "questions of accelerating scientific-technical progress," sponsored in the following month, on 11 June 1985, by the CPSU Central Committee.⁷⁴ Gorbachev's speech on "the basic problem in the party's economic policy" now found at least its essential passages reprinted in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.⁷⁵

In the following we shall not trace the further reporting on Soviet domestic policy in the GDR media in the time before the two party congresses, though there was not much that was published. For example, in the theoretical party organ EINHEIT, throughout the entire second half of 1985 there is but one single article which--rather incidentally--makes reference to Soviet domestic policy.⁷⁶ In all the articles that serve the ideological preparation for its own 11th party congress, one finds merely references to the Soviet "peace policy." But no link is established with the prevailing domestic policy development in the USSR.

3.1 The 27th CPSU Congress

This ostrich-like policy could no longer be maintained when the 27th CPSU Congress was approaching late in February 1986. The first one to pull his head out of the sand was the Moscow correspondent of WELTBUEHNE. In an article with the headline "A Gigantic Land in Motion" he reported that in the Soviet Union the atmosphere was likened to "the rallying mood after the 20th party congress." With irony he pointed out that this mood "had lately even been reported by some western correspondents from the Soviet Union." That article remained an exception. His colleagues in the GDR continued to keep covered.

In reporting about the party congress itself NEUES DEUTSCHLAND kept pursuing the previous line. Wherever it could not be avoided, information became extensive, such as Gorbachev's status report with a direct transmission via GDR TV and reported unabridged.⁷⁸ Yet of the discussion during the party congress, of its self-critical atmosphere, of the disputes carried out there quite openly, the reader of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND learned next to nothing. With it, the extremes on both sides were smoothed out. The reader of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND was spared the almost ghostly warning from KGB boss Chebrikov against "ideological diversion" in the fields of "politics and law, philosophy and religion, ethics and morality, i.e. in the very fields in which the contest of ideas takes place."⁷⁹

He also was spared Gromyko's repugnance to the "carping at honest communists" and his ambiguous warning, put in the form of a quotation from a letter of complaint: "Among us people do not believe the ones who promise everything!" That remark, for that matter, had even caused a "stir in the hall."⁸⁰

On the other side of the spectrum, reform-minded contributions were cut down so much they became incomprehensible. We wish to cite an example of it: the speech of the new Moscow party boss Yeltsin.⁸¹ His criticism of the Central Committee apparatus is omitted as much as his self-critical question why he had failed to commit himself accordingly even at the last party congress.⁸² Remarkable is also how Yeltsin's deliberations on the problem of "social justice" were reported. First the full text in PRAVDA:

"The delegates in the work collectives are sure to have run into questions of social justice. They are always being vehemently debated because they affect a broad circle of men's central and vital interests. You become uncomfortable listening to any indignation about any sort of injustice--present or already past. But most painful it becomes when direct references are made to any sort of favors for managers. When a communist and manager loses the skills he needs: justice, party-minded humility, total personal dedication, when he gets nothing for his work, then--to quote Lenin--"it injures democratism and forms a source for the moral decay of the party." Adding to this, Yeltsin demands "to abolish concessions for managers on all levels when they are not justified." None of this argument is found in the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND version. All that is left is the last sentence, and that stands there so much all by itself that the effect is affirmative and not critical: "The criteris... for social justice, Boris Yeltsin said, were the interests, above all, of the workers class."

After the 27th party congress, the SED Politburo, as it is wont to do after an event like that, endeavored an assessment of the importance of it for its own party members. In an official position on it on 12 March 1986, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes: "The Politburo paid tribute to the 27th CPSU Congress as an outstanding event (...) on the path of the Soviet communists and all the Soviet people (...) in shaping a new (...) society." It "enriched the store of experiences of the fraternal parties . . . , provides them with valuable suggestions"

That sounds friendly, but just what does it mean? To the Soviet communists the party congress is an "outstanding event," but to the SED its importance is confined to "valuable suggestions" (and "impulses")--a nonobligatory flourish of language if there ever was one. This downgrading becomes even more apparent if the position taken here is compared with that on the 26th party congress in 1981. That party congress, the last one under Brezhnev, likewise was hailed as a "milestone of the Soviet people proceeding toward the communist future," but then it continued to say: "The Politburo attributes to the 26th party congress resolution an importance of principle for the continued shaping of the developed socialist society (...) in the GDR."⁸³

A sentence like that is looked for in vain in the GDR press of today. In 1981 the SED members were urged "thoroughly to appropriate the party congress resolutions and materials and combine them organically with the preparations for the (their own--author) 10th party congress."

In March 1986, however, their task was "to combine the exploitation of the 27th CPSU Congress documents creatively with their further work."

Instead of an "organic" now a "creative" combination. What makes the difference? The degree to which the Soviet resolutions are authoritative. Approaching them "creatively" means making a maximum use of one's own leeway for interpretation. That interpretation starts already in the manner the concept "acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the country" is transmitted. According to what one considers one's own achievement, the concept is defined entirely in the sense of the narrow reform concept: "This (...) course lies in proceeding toward a more highly organized and efficient economy with all-round developed productive forces, developed socialist production relations, and an accurately functioning economic mechanism."⁸⁴

In contradistinction to the narrow reform concept in the Soviet debate (and in conformity with their own "main task," the "unity of economic and social policy"), that definition is further complemented by reference to "an active social policy (...) as effective means for enforcing the economic strategy."

The reception pattern portrayed up to this point was partly fractured in April 1986 by Kurt Hager's EINHEIT contribution.⁸⁵ That article went quite far in calling a spade a spade. Not only is the critique of "bureaucratism" and "stagnation manifestations" cited, but the "acceleration" also is being presented much more extensively as a "key to solving the economic, social, political and ideological, the internal and external problems of the USSR." Even the politically explosive topics of "boosting publicity" and expanding industrial participation are mentioned.⁸⁷ To be sure, interested GDR citizens

had meanwhile become familiar with these points thanks to the publication of the Gorbachev status report in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. The likely question was what all this would have to mean to the SED as the EINHEIT issue that contained Hager's article was the one that was published directly before the 11th party congress. Strange enough, however, that party congress is not mentioned even with one word in the whole article. Five years earlier, Hermann Axen had concluded his article on the Soviet party congress at that time⁸⁸ with the following words: "The study of the 26th party congress documents (...), which all communists and working people in the GDR are urged to engage in, inspires new ideas and deeds in preparation for the 10th SED Congress and the implementation of its far-reaching resolutions."

The functional equivalent for such urging was, in Hager in 1986, a Honecker quotation: "Our party also takes from it (from the 27th party congress) important suggestions for future efforts."

That sounds fairly undercooled. To underline that it could also be rated differently, let us quote a position taken by the Hungarian "fraternal party." Matyas Szuros, Central Committee secretary for international relations, wrote in a commentary for the party paper NEPSZABADSAG: "The brave stand taken by the CPSU party congress against pertinent old ideas and prejudices is an encouragement for the creative searching for a path in all countries and communist parties."⁸⁹

3.2 The 11th SED Congress

The for the time being last chapter in this history of reception was the 11th SED Congress itself.⁹⁰ This party congress enjoyed what was then still the special honor that Gorbachev attended it all the way through and, moreover, delivered the by far most vivid speech during the whole party congress.⁹¹ There has been much speculation about why Gorbachev attended. It also likely was a sort of distinction acknowledged for the SED's successful policy, and it is quite obvious that Gorbachev, who last was in the GDR in 1966, availed himself of the opportunity to become better acquainted with the executive team of one of the most important "fraternal states." For the rest it probably concerned foreign policy issues: using the highly symbolic location of Berlin to announce a new disarmament initiative and settling differences of opinion regarding the GDR's policy toward the FRG. It is not likely to have been coincidental that the previously once again suggested visit by Honecker to the FRG no longer was a topical subject after the Soviet delegation had departed.

The differences between the SED and the CPSU were of course not openly aired at this party congress. Which does not mean that they played no role there. The uncritical and smug atmosphere at that party congress itself differed so strikingly from the impetuous mood of the CPSU congress one and a half months before, that this direction alone amounted to a commentary.⁹² Moreover, one only has to compare Honecker's "status report"⁹³ with Gorbachev's of the 27th party congress to grasp the pattern of the conflict. Here one may well assume that Honecker's speech writers studied the Gorbachev report most thoroughly even if they do not refer to it even once. The result of such study was a positive contrasting program, as it were, which takes its clues, and its

demarcation, from the Soviet precursor, partly echoing its formulations. A few examples will demonstrate that.

Reviewing recent years, Gorbachev said: "For years the practical acts by the party and state organs lagged behind the requirements of the time, the requirements of life itself. The problems in the development of the country grew more rapidly than they were settled."⁹⁴ Honecker, in contrast: "Our party carried on its proven practice of reacting at the proper time to ripening problems and thus keeping in step with life."⁹⁵

Plan fulfilment. Whereas Gorbachev asserts that "the tasks for the 9th and 10th 5-Year Plan (i.e. 1976 - 1985--author) were not fulfilled,"⁹⁶ Honecker observes: "The 1981-1985 plan was completed well."⁹⁷

Efficiency of the economic machinery. "Solving new tasks in the economy without a pervasive transformation of the economic mechanism," according to Gorbachev, "is impossible."⁹⁸ Honecker has a different view on that for his country as well: "The GDR has a well functioning system of socialist planned economy. It is proving itself efficient, dynamic, and flexible."⁹⁹

Environmental protection. In this sector, according to Gorbachev, there are, to be sure, "practical results to be noted. Still, the environmental condition in a number of regions is alarming." In this context the speaker paid tribute also to the commitment shown by a critical public, particularly the writers, to the concerns of environmental protection.¹⁰⁰ According to Honecker, in the GDR "for the further protection of the natural environment (...) large funds are allocated to expand or newly establish appropriate capacities in industry and agriculture."¹⁰¹ Problems do not seem to exist here. At least they are not being mentioned (though one might still think of a few things--such as relate to the utilization of lignite), and one can apparently do without any critical commitment by the citizens because not even the "Society for Nature and the Environment," founded in 1980, is found worth mentioning.

Mass media. As was already pointed out, something has changed in this sphere last year in the USSR. Gorbachev called attention to it; nonetheless, this is what he says: "Still much is offered that is trivial, and the deafness to innovations has not been fully cured as yet. The public complains about insufficient relevance of event-related reporting and the superficial handling of the struggle for all that is progressive."¹⁰²

In the GDR, if one is to believe Honecker, there can be no such complaints "since about the domestic and foreign policy in the GDR, as dealt with by the Central Committee since the 10th party congress, not only our party, but the whole public is, one may say, informed down to the finest detail."¹⁰³

These differences in views as referred to by examples actually always again come down to one and the same thing: while the Soviet leadership sees itself at the start of a turning point of historic significance, the SED insists that what really exists is reasonable too even if "the attained is not yet the attainable."¹⁰⁴ One could, conceivably, object that these differences do not make that much difference ultimately because they merely reflect diverse problem situation, for, actually, the two countries do differ from each other quite a lot. But such an objection does not stand up for several reasons:

For one thing, the key problem of Gorbachev's conception exists also in the other socialist countries, namely, that a reform policy confined to the economic sphere is not sufficient to release the potential necessary for new dynamics in economic development and therefore requires the sociopolitical addition. However, the social dynamics released thereby are, on the one side, to be strong enough to overcome the vested interests that are blocking efficiency yet, on the other side, not so strong that they would place the stability of the entire system in doubt. That indeed is a tough balancing act.

Secondly, from the SED vantage point Gorbachev's reform policy is, to be sure, a specifically Soviet piece of business, yet that is a notion the CPSU does not absolutely share. Gorbachev himself announced at the 11th SED Congress: "The socialist world (and not just the Soviet Union--author) is experiencing a special period, one may say a period of revolutionary change (perelomniy)."105

At the same time he pointed out that "the specifics in the development of each fraternal country" would be reflected in that "the concrete forms of manifestation" of any given policy were "varied." That is to say, leeway is being offered. Yet whether or not one can as permanently as the SED is trying to do keep out of this process of change, seems highly dubious for reasons still to be discussed. And thirdly, this reform policy development has revived an old problem that Ulbricht already struggled with: the social science underpinning for the Soviet hegemonic position. That shall be dealt with still in the next section.

3.3 Construction, Structuring, Perfecting

In sketching the Soviet reform process, Konstantin Chernenko's role might have been slighted somewhat. It was he, one must remember, who not only let things roll but, in spite of everything, he was--in continuing a development which already had surfaced late under Brezhnev--at least in one if a central point an ideological innovator. His achievement was that he modified defining the historical definition of the situation of the Soviet system. Or, in other words: instead of attempting a policy that would have propelled the development of the system in accordance with ideology, he adapted the ideology to the shape of the system (analogous with creating the term of "truly existing socialism.").

Up to the early 1980's the accepted doctrine had been that in the Soviet Union the "developed socialist society" already was in place, which was now being "perfected" and was about to start growing into "communism."106 At the 26th party congress in 1981, Brezhnev then, while announcing the revision of the party program, modified this in so far as he defined the "phase of the developed socialist society" as a "necessary, inevitable and historically lengthy period in the development of communist society."107 Chernenko, however, went a long stretch beyond that thesis when he remarked in a program speech, reprinted in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 27 April 1984, "that we find ourselves at the beginning of a historically long lasting phase, the phase of developed socialism."

Such homely sounding modification has far-reaching ideological consequences as far as the relationship between the USSR and its "fraternal countries" is concerned. To the extent that these countries are themselves industrially developed, it does away with the justification of a pioneering role of the USSR still effective today¹⁰⁸ and, hence, with any basis for ideologically elevating Soviet policy as the norm for socialist development. Furthermore, the SED could then also have understood this revaluation, post ex facto, as its vindication for the position it took in the debate about the character of the socialist system in the late 1960's. That dispute involved the question whether "developed socialism" was a "system in its own right" with correspondingly long developmental perspectives on its own foundation, as the SED contended, or whether it was to be considered as a rapidly passing "lower phase of communism," as was the contention of the Soviet social scientists.¹⁰⁹ Even then, in the final analysis, it involved the questions of a "sovereignty" of GDR developments.

Now the question was how the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev, which is by no means willing, after all, to adapt itself to prevailing conditions, would deal with this problem, how it would compromise between the demand for dynamism on the one side and its aversion to any ideological whitewash on the other, while defining the Soviet Union's position within the "socialist community." When he was still the "second man" in the party, in December 1984, in a speech given at that time, Gorbachev took over Chernenko's formula.¹¹⁰ At the 27th party congress he also affirmed "that our country has entered the phase of developed socialism," and then he added: "It is appropriate to recall that among us the thesis of developed socialism was spread as a reaction to simplistic notions of the ways and time frames for resolving the tasks of communist construction."

Simultaneously, however, he also expressed himself on the requirement in the "fraternal countries": "We also show understanding for how the task of developed socialism is framed in the program documents of the fraternal parties in the socialist countries."

This "understanding" now--on a lower level--applies to the old hierarchy: The USSR has already entered "developed socialism," but the "fraternal states" are still in the process of constructing it. That notion must be unacceptable to the SED because it would be turned back in its sense of identity for more than 20 years.¹¹² That is the reason why Gorbachev was "corrected." In the translation of his status report in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, "construction" (postroeniye) was casually turned into the "shaping" of developed socialism.¹¹³ That is not what the Russian text says, but it accords with the SED's sense of identity.

In neither case is that a slip of the pen. The GDR leadership meanwhile is making the contention that it is at least on the same historic developmental level as the Soviet Union. That is shown, e.g., by a publication on the "socialist community," prepared in 1985 at the SED Central Committee's Social Sciences Academy.¹¹⁴ There Chernenko's above quoted remark is agreed to, after which one is talking, without any further explanation, of the "perfecting" of developed socialism in the USSR and its "shaping" in the GDR, the CSSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria.¹¹⁵ This differentiation no longer contains any meaning of substance--except that it raises the demand for "being held equal in terms of the philosophy of history," without making an explicit formulation of it.

On the other side, to Gorbachev there not only is a highly essential difference between "construction" and "perfection" of socialism, which follow each other, but the latter quite obviously is equivalent to the GDR term "shaping."¹¹⁶

Whether the two conceptions can permanently coexist without a rub seems dubious. They do, after all, suggest a hegemonic conflict, even if for the time being only in the domain of the "philosophy of history." The Soviet side has thus far largely bracketed this problem. The new CPSU party program simply circumvents this point. Yet it hits the eye that in Gorbachev's "status report," who after all could much more rely than his predecessors could on economic reform analyses made in other CEMA countries,¹¹⁷ and unlike that of Brezhnev,¹¹⁸ any positive reference to concrete reform projects in other socialist countries is missing. On the GDR at least Gorbachev had commented positively at least twice last year. Those passages were deleted in the compendium of his speeches and articles that was published late last year.¹¹⁹

Nor has the SED tacitly settled for there being in fact a coexistence of disparate views on this point. Seeking to explain how irrelevant the Soviet reform policy is for its own system, it has gone beyond the implied demand for equality--much like the late Ulbricht.¹²⁰ The handle for it is the narrowed-down interpretation of the Soviet reform process as economic reform, economic reform as transition to "intensification." In using that term--which Brezhnev had already used before--in place of Gorbachev's "acceleration," the central tasks in both systems seem closer together, but their solution is unevenly advanced. At the 11th SED Congress, in his speech on the economic plan, Stoph asserted: "Our management and planning system is adapted to the requirements of the new stage in the economic strategy."¹²¹ And Honecker explained that point by saying: "Through our economic strategy we managed to turn the production intensification into the decisive basis for performance improvement."¹²²

But what is it all about that in the Soviet Union? In the article on the Soviet party congress, already cited, Kurt Hager observes: "With impressive resolve the CPSU party congress focused on the strategic course of comprehensive intensification. Nor did it leave any doubt that the Soviet Union stands only at the beginning of this tough road."¹²³

The Soviet Union only stands "at the beginning," while the GDR is already operating on that "basis": this reversal of the "pioneering role" is the key for the SED's new sense of identity. How able it is to bear that load, however, will still have to be proven.

4. Permanent "Self-Reliance?"

What importance attaches to these differences between the conservatism of the SED and the reformism of the CPSU(-leadership)? Can both permanently coexist? How much elbow room does the SED leadership have in domestic policy?

Even what has been presented up to this point has shown that the elbow room, in any event, is large enough for the latest turn in Soviet policy not being at once followed in the GDR. That might even be so in concurrence with the Soviet leadership because its reception for the "GDR model" seems ambivalent.

The respect Gorbachev, while addressing the SED party congress, expressed for the GDR's economic accomplishments sounded honest: "Everywhere in the GDR one senses the hand of the provider and host as which the people perceives itself in the socialist state."¹²⁴

When visiting the SED Central Committee's Institute for Socialist Economic Management, Gorbachev found a formula for that stance. He asked the functionaries and scientists surrounding him: "Do you know how we translate 'German Democratic Republic' into Russian?" And then he answered his own question: "Davay, davay, rabotat! (Up, Up, Work). Otherwise it is hard to imagine he could have failed to look with a degree of skepticism at the demonstrative lack of criticism during this party congress. After all, he had since 1971 attended all party congresses under Brezhnev; he knows of all the things that can be covered up by success announcements.

After Gorbachev had returned to Moscow, a few days later PRAVDA put out a lead article that assessed the SED party congress. Entitled "Uniform Goals, Joint Tasks," there one could read: "The successes of the first socialist state on German soil are evident and weighty. Yet one has to look ahead and keep advancing. Right now the socialist world is going through a special, revolutionary period. History confronts the fraternal countries with the need to make better use of the advantages of the new social order."¹²⁵

Decisive in this statement is that in the view of PRAVDA the "turn" does not amount to anything specific in the Soviet Union but concerns the "socialist world." It can only be understood as slightly ironic if the GDR's reaction to their own 27th congress is interpreted as an "endorsement of the correctness of the course taken, inspiration and impetus." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, by the way--against its normal editorial practices--published that lead article only after a 3-day delay.¹²⁶

Still, one should not make too much of the differences between the SED and the CPSU. As long as the SED's economic policy is successful and guarantees domestic stability, the party will be able to refer to Gorbachev's thesis that "the unity (of the socialist community) has nothing in common with uniformity, hierarchy, or the claim by one party to possessing a monopoly on truth."¹²⁷

In view of the abundance of problem children within CEMA (Poland, Romania and--or the periphery of CEMA--Yugoslavia) one may well assume that even in Soviet eyes the interest in holding on to stability comes first. To the extent that the Soviet leadership has expressed itself on these matters, it indicated that while it demands political conformity within the bloc in the Western policy, it is yet prepared to grant rather broad a leeway in domestic policy--on the premise of the "socialist inevitabilities" and the "irreversibility" of the socialist revolution.¹²⁸ The SED thus far has adapted itself largely to these contours of a conception. It relinquishes the idea of Honecker's trip to the FRG, is indefatigable in propagating the Soviet disarmament proposals, and keeps on an even keel in its domestic policy.

For all that, the present constellation brings to mind the last phase of the Ulbricht era. At that time there were two areas of conflict with the Soviet Union: the self-reliance in socialist development in the GDR and--probably much more importantly--Ulbricht's rejecting a detente policy at the expense of the GDR's sovereignty claims.¹²⁹ Both problem areas have become topical again under altered circumstances. Formerly the SED--different from today--moved in the same direction in domestic policy as the CPSU; both parties wanted some degree of economic reforms. The SED, to be sure, has made more of this intent despite the difficulties it plunged into in 1969/70 and again in the early 1980's. From that it now derives the premise for aggressively expounding its "self-reliance." In his "status report," Honecker said about it: "The deepening of the international collaboration of the communists today is based on the independence and accountability of each party in preparing and implementing its policy."¹³⁰

With respect to the second point the constellation has not reversed itself, yet it has changed. The SED leadership is proud that "in a situation of sharpest international confrontation it reliably steered our ship through the surf."¹³²

That is why it wants to continue holding on to the German-German mini-detente. The Soviet leadership also wants detente, to be sure, yet it is prepared to use as leverage for it its relations with the West European states--in particular with the FRG. It is not likely to be prepared to accept without consequences activities such as the SDI accord. Such consequences would be bound to affect the GDR's Western policy as well. Thereby the Honecker leadership slides into an extremely intricate situation because its supreme goal, stability, is placed in double jeopardy by the Soviet policy: It promises itself nothing positive from a carry-over of Gorbachev's dynamization policy. Freezing the special relations between the two German states would at least frustrate its own population. For that matter, the wait-and-see attitude seems in fact the closest alternative.

But can such a policy assume permanent status? What speaks against it is that both countries, even if their leaderships wanted it, can relate to each other not only as foreign policy actors. The Gorbachev leadership is squeezed in a very serious domestic policy conflict over enforcing its reform policy; almost every other lead article in PRAVDA attests to that. However great its interest may be in stable conditions in the GDR--it cannot find it immaterial whether it is getting support for or indifference toward its policy from the "fraternal parties."¹³² The incumbent SED executive may try to wait and see what will come of the whole thing yet it cannot fully screen its somewhat interested and committed members and functionaries completely off what is going on in the Soviet Union. How should it be able to prevent permanently that the Soviet reform process, unless it fails prematurely, becomes the reference point and catalyst for reform aspirations in its own party? Speculations about what such aspirations could be like would be moot here, but handles for it are abundant enough: from the innovation problems in the economy and the problem of work motivation to the questions of more of a participation on the regional level, to questions of cultural and media policy, of environmental protection and so forth. All these questions, however, I think, turn around a key point: an articulation of partial social interests free from party or state regimentation.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. Spoerl, "The FDJ Functionary," DIE ZEIT, 27 June 1986, p 10.
2. "Kleines Politisches Woerterbuch," East Berlin, 1973, p 432.
3. P. Markowski, 1975, p 1341.
4. Cf. "Honecker's 'Status Report' to the 11th Party Congress." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 April 1986, p 9.
5. Cf. for the following McAdams, 1985; Sodaro, 1983; Stent, 1984.
6. Cf. Bender, 1986, pp 78 ff.
7. Unlimited diplomatic recognition, neutralization of West Berlin as a "special political unit."
8. Cf. Asmus, 1984; Kuppe, 1984; Seifert, 1984; Oldenburg, 1984.
9. Kuppe, DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No 12, pp 1275-1277.
10. Cf. Staritz, 1985, pp 203 ff; and Sodaro, 1983.
11. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 April 1986, p 3.
12. Cf. the greater detail of Framatzki, 1986; Hoehmann, 1985; Schmidt-Haeuer 1986; Timmermann, 1985.
13. Cf. Kosta/Levcik, 1985; Hoehmann, 1985.
14. Thus the labor productivity in Soviet industry in the early 1980's came to 55 percent of the U.S. level, in agriculture, to between 20 and 25 percent. -- "USSR in Figures for 1984," Moscow, 1985, p 64.
15. The produced national income per unit of productive capital assets dropped by 25 percent in the USSR between 1970 and 1980. Cf. Authors' Collective, "Die Sozialistische Gemeinschaft. Interessen--Zusammenarbeit--Wirtschaftswachstum" [The Socialist Community. Interests--Collaboration--Economic Growth], Berlin, 1985, p 135.
16. Cf., e.g., B. V. Vinokurov/K. Zuev, "Topical Problems in the Development of Computer Technology," KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1985, pp 18-29; excerpted in OSTEUROPA 35/1985/12, pp 655 ff; and "Sowjet-Union 1984/85. Ereignisse, Probleme, Perspektiven," Munich, 1985, pp 115 ff.
17. Cf. "Sowjet-Union 1982/83, Ereignisse, Probleme, Perspektiven," Munich, 1983, pp 338 f.; and H G. Buetow, ed., "Laenderbericht Sowjet-Union," Munich, 1986, pp 104 f.
18. Cf. Medvedyev, 1983, pp 135 ff; Simis, 1982; and Schoepflin, 1984.

19. The most explosive crisis surely was the one in Poland. That this, as Soviet "traditionalists" have claimed (cf. Suess, 1985) was due to something specific owing to the "transitional character" of Polish society, has recently been denied by Gorbachev addressing the 10th PZPR Congress: "The crisis of the 1970's and early 1980's that shook your society reflected its contradictions. But it also embodied the entire intricacy of the ongoing struggle between the two systems and pointedly brought out those problems with which socialism is confronted in the extremely complicated revolutionary change of its development. That is why the lessons of the Polish crisis are important not only for the Polish communists." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 1 July 1986, p 5. For the crisis-like situation in Eastern Europe in that period generally, cf. Staniszakis, 1979; Mlynar, 1983; Brus/Kende/Mlynar, 1984; and Kosta/Levcik, 1985.
20. For the 1950's and 1960's, cf. Cohen, 1984.
21. For the 1920's, cf. Lewin, 1975.
22. Cohen, 1984; Laird/Hoffmann, 1984.
23. They engaged in polemics against all too strongly broadened merchandise-money relations and preached increased "collectivism." Cf. e.g., Kosolapov, 1984 and Udovenko, 1983.
24. The new CPSU program, as ratified by the 27th party congress, states: "The party takes into account that in the 1970's and early 1980's, along with the undoubtedly attained successes in the development of the country, certain unfavorable difficulties and tendencies occurred. They were greatly due to the fact that changes in the economic situation and also the needs for pervasive changes in all domains of life were not assessed at the proper time and in the requisite manner, nor was the necessary consistency shown in enforcing them." KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1986, p 114.
25. PRESSE DER SOWJETUNION, 1971, No 40, p 26.
26. Gorbachev, "Appeals and debates about it (the 'conversion of the economy to intensive developmental methods') were plenty, but in practice the matter got stuck." PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 4.
27. In the most important publication of his brief tenure, "The Doctrine of Karl Marx and Some Questions About Socialist Construction in the USSR," Andropov wrote: "Our efforts are now concentrated on boosting production efficiency and that of the entire economy. The party and the Soviet people have understood the importance of this problem in its full scope. As to its practical solution, however, things are not moving ahead so very successfully." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25 February 1983, p 3.
28. Ibid.
29. Cf. Medvedyev, 1983, pp 152 ff.

30. "On Summoning the Regular 27th CPSU Congress and on the Tasks Linked with Preparing and Conducting It," Gorbachev, 1985, pp 7-28.
31. Cf., e.g., the party congress report from Sizov, chairman of the CPSU Auditing Commission: "The CPSU program revision is based on the conception of the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development, presented at the CPSU Central Committee's April 1985 plenum," PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 11.
32. Cf. "CPSU Central Committee Plenum Resolution on Summoning the Regular 27th CPSU Congress," TASS/APN, 23 April 1985, "Sowjetunion heute" 30/1985/6 p ix. - Gorbachev himself already used that term at the ideology conference the CPSU held in December 1985. Cf. "Sovershestvovaniye . . .," 1985, p 9.
33. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 4.
34. Ibid., 27 February 1986, p 2.
35. Cf. Rahr, 1986, pp 219 f.
36. PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, p 2.
37. "The Leninist party, the party of the communists, has always functioned as the vanguard of the people. Today it is appointed to head the movement of all the people for accelerating the country's socioeconomic development." (Speech at the April 1985 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee), Gorbachev, 1985, p 17.
38. PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, p 2.
39. Ibid., p 5.
40. Ibid., p 6.
41. Ibid.
42. "Persuading the broad strata of the working people of the correctness of the course chosen, stimulating them morally and materially, and reshaping cadre psychology--those are the most important prerequisites for accelerating our growth," PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 4.
43. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 10.
44. Ibid., 1 March 1986.
45. Gorbachev, "Sovershestvovaniye . . .," 1985, p 10.
46. I am thinking here of the wider diversification in the central Soviet press (newspapers like PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, magazines like LITERATURNAYA GAZETA), of the relatively frank criticism permitted during the congresses

of the Russian and the Soviet Writers Associations in December 1985 and June 1986 respectively as at the trade union congress of the movie-makers in May 1986, of the enlarged leeway the Moscow theater seems to have gained meanwhile and other things like that. The same trend is suggested by the personnel policy changes in the respective associations and institutions.

47. PRAVDA, 26 March 1986, p 7 (Gorbachev).
48. In his party speech, Ligachov steered a middle-course. He praised the role of "the press, TV, and radio" as organs of criticism while he scolded the PRAVDA editorial board for having gone too far (PRAVDA, 28 February 1986, p 4). Gromyko warned against "contriving fissures in our party and in Soviet society" and deplored the "carping at honest communists" (PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, p 6). Chebrikov reported on the "unmasking of ideological diversion." That "diversion" was "aimed at exercising a hostile influence on the views and persuasion of Soviet men and subverting their faith in the communist ideals" (PRAVDA, 1 March 1986). At the most recent plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev reported--what was not likely to be regarded as a unique anecdote--that "local organs" (i.e. the local KGB) had intercepted a letter of complaint from party members on an unjustified discrimination against a director of an enterprise, which had been addressed to the Central Control Commission of the CPSU--which also is a form of fighting for publicity (KOMMUNIST, 1986/10, pp 30f.).
49. Cf. C. Bertram, "Condemned Too Fast?" DIE ZEIT, 16 May 1986, pp 9 f. - It seems more than likely that even on the top level such internal confrontations on this information policy have taken place. The contention from the Soviet reform communist Roy Medvedev, however, that in the crucial Politburo session on 28 April 1986, 2 days after the accident, a minority made up of Gorbachev, Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and KGB boss Chebrikov, could not prevail with their demand for open information, sounds, in this configuration at least, more like a KGB-launched canard (cf. K. Devlin, "Gorbachev in minority at Politburo meeting on Chernobyl, Medvedev says," Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report/78 [USSR], 5 June 1986.).
50. IZVESTIYA, 15 February 1986, p 3.
51. On the prehistory of the participation debate, cf. Tatur, 1978; Huber, 1983, pp 161 ff; and Yanowitch, 1985.
52. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 7.
53. Which Gorbachev, however, has commented on in a remarkable fashion: "There is no vanguard role of the communists per se; it manifests itself in practical deeds," PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 9.
54. The information about this concrete occasion for his criticism does not stem from Ligachov himself, but from Afansief, editor-in-chief of PRAVDA, who told Western journalists about it in a background briefing close to the party congress (E. Siegl, "Quite Some Cheek from PRAVDA," FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 5 March 1986, p 2).

55. Even Stalin advertised his rise to absolute power, among other things, as a fight against "bureaucratism" and "heartlessness."

56. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 5.

57. PRESSE DER SOWJETUNION 1971/24, p 219.

58. PRAVDA, 26 March 1986, p 2.

59. Ibid., 27 February 1986, p 3.

60. Ibid.

61. DER SPIEGEL, 1986/21, p 76.

62. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 9 May 1986, p 3.

63. PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, p 4.

64. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 23 April 1986, p 5.

65. "On Summoning . . .," op. cit., loc. cit.

66. Ibid., p 10.

67. W. Boettger, "Political Accountability and Linguistic Diversity," NEUE DEUTSCHE PRESSE, 40/1096/3, p 20. (This journal is the journal of the GDR Journalists Association.)

68. Ibid., p 9.

69. Ibid., p 19.

70. Ibid., p 14.

71. Ibid., p 20.

72. Ibid., p 19.

73. The outward occasion for this brief visit was the unveiling of a memorial for German antifascists at Krasnogorsk. Remarkable about this visit was that Honecker, arriving, was received only by the Moscow party boss Grishin who was deposed soon thereafter. (Cf. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 6 May 1985, p 6; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND did not report it). After a conversation proceeding "in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete harmony" (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6 May 1986, p 1) the committee accompanying him to take off, composed of five top functionaries, was mounted much more adequately (cf. ibid., p 2). Perhaps they cleared up some differences in the meantime.

74. Cf. PRAVDA, 12 June 1985, pp 1 f. An attentive reader will notice that in announcing the topic of the conference, the more narrow term, "acceleration of scientific-technical progress," was used. But in his own speech,

Gorbachev holds on to the broader term, "acceleration of socioeconomic development," and uses the former term to designate a partial strategy, synonymous with "revolutionary changes in economic intensification." "The Basic Question in the Party's Economic Strategy," Gorbachev, 1985, pp 108-136, specifically p 111.

75. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 13 June 1985, pp 5 f.
76. Herbert Krolkowski, "A Treaty of Historic Consequence," EINHEIT 40/1985/10, pp 867-871, for the 10th anniversary of the GDR-USSR friendship treaty. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that in that article also Gorbachev's "acceleration of socioeconomic development" is not mentioned by name but instead the older term, "perfecting of developed socialism," is used to define Soviet policy (ibid., p 871). - In addition to that article, EINHEIT 1985/12 carried a speech by Gorbachev.
77. DIE WELTBUEHNE, 18 February 1986, pp 193-196. The author was Christian Neef.
78. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 26 February 1986, pp 3-12.
79. PRAVDA, 1 March 1986 and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 1/2 March 1986, p 3 (Summary of the Chebrikov speech).
80. PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, p 6 and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 27 February 1986, p 4.
81. PRAVDA, 27 February 1986, pp 2 f; and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 27 February 1986, p 3.
82. "Not by chance has the structure of the Central Committee departments gradually become almost a copy of the ministries. Many in the departments simply have forgotten what party work actually is all about. There is a complete duplication of the State Planning Commission, of the Council of Ministers. We are getting worn out through coordinations that take years for simple questions." -- "The delegates may ask me why I did not talk about it when I spoke up at the 26th party congress. Well, I can answer that question and can answer honestly: What I lacked at the time evidently was courage and was political experience."
83. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 11 March 1981, p 1. The formulation was similar in 1976 in the "SED Central Committee Resolution on the 25th CPSU Congress", to wit: "The universal experiences of the CPSU are of great importance for the continued shaping of the developed socialist society in the GDR. The SED Central Committee urges all party organizations to keep making themselves thoroughly familiar with the resolutions and materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and to include them in the preparations for the Ninth SED Congress. Their all-round exploitation will tap for us new sources for solving the tasks ahead." EINHEIT, 31/1976/4, p 405.
84. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 March 1986, p 1.
85. "A Turn of Historic Significance--Report on the 27th CPSU Congress," EINHEIT 41/1986/4-5, pp 304-313.

86. Ibid., p 307.
87. Ibid., p 310.
88. Hermann Axen, "An Event of Global Importance—On the Results of the 26th CPSU Congress," EINHEIT, 36/1981/4-5, pp 331-339.
89. NEPSZABADSAG, 8 March 1986, in German in BUDAPESTER RUNDSCHAU, 17 March 1986, p 3.
90. Cf. Zimmermann, 1986; Ammer/Kuppe, 1986; and Spittmann, 1986. Comparing this year's 1 May slogans of the SED and the CPSU also is interesting; Danylow, 1986.
91. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 April 1986, pp 3 f.
92. It is unlikely that Gorbachev made reference only to internal Soviet disputes when he said in his address: "Sometimes the questions is asked whether we have not made too much of self-criticism and thereby fed anti-communist propaganda. No, we are convinced we have not made too much of it. Marx and Lenin have taught us that a critical attitude toward one's own activity is an indispensable condition for the success of a revolutionary party." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 April 1986, p 3.
93. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 April 1986, pp 3-9.
94. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 2.
95. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 April 1986, p 4.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. In that period, the GDR's produced national income should have been growing annually by 5.1 percent, whereas it actually only came to 4.4 percent. In the USSR, 4.0 percent of yearly growth was planned, but only 3.5 percent was materialized.
98. Ibid., p 5.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p 6.
101. Ibid., p 5.
102. Ibid., p 10.
103. Ibid., p 3. -- That diagnosis remains far behind what has meanwhile been said about this subject even in the GDR. Werner Mittenzwei, one of the top GDR literary scientists, e.g., has spoken of the "innocuousness of scientifically or journalistically coping with the past" in that country. For all that, it concerned a development that took place, precisely, in

"the 1970's," in the Honecker era, in other words, and which induced the public "to depart from public relations and enter many small private worlds. Arks were built and niches were sought in order to discuss what one believed was simply covered up or disappeared under all too many qualifications." Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences, GDR, GESELLSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN, 1984, No 10/G, Berlin, 1984, pp 31 f.

104. Honecker, op. cit., p 4.
105. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 April 1986, p 3.
106. Cf., e.g., Kim, 1981. -- "From 1959 on, struggle (of the CPSU) for perfecting the developed socialist society and the gradual construction of the material-technical base of communism." "Kleines politisches Woerterbuch," Berlin, 1973, p 429.
107. Brezhnev, 1981, p 107; cf. Zimmermann, 1984, p 82.
108. To clarify this point once more: In a joint project produced by the social science research institutes under the respective central committees of the ruling communist parties on "The Socialist Society Today," published in 1984, the hierarchy of the "socialist community" is portrayed as follows: "In this historic period (of the 1960's and 1970's--author) the Soviet Union concluded the formation of the developed socialist society and is materializing today a comprehensive program for the further perfecting of the developed socialist society and the gradual transition to communism. A number of countries in the socialist community, after having laid the foundations for socialism, are resolving the tasks toward shaping the developed socialist society. Some countries in the socialist community are laying the foundations for socialism." (Jegorow/Reinhold, 1984, p 24).
109. Cf. Voelkel, 1973.
110. During a CPSU conference on ideological issues he said "that we find ourselves at the beginning of the historically lengthy phase of developed socialism." M. S. Gorbachev, "Vital Creativity by the People," "Sovershestvovaniye . . .," op. cit., p 9.
111. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 10.
112. Something like that is not to be precluded. The SED used the same method when it explained the "Polish crisis" of 1980/81 by saying that the Polish People's Republic still was contending with the problems of being a society in transition to socialism. (Cf. Suess, 1985).
113. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 26 February 1986, p 12.
114. Authors' Collective, 1985.
115. Ibid., p 21.

116. In his previously cited speech of December 1984, he commented as follows: "As life shows, the perfecting of socialism is a no less complicated and responsible task than the one the party and the people had to fulfil in the preceding stages of its construction." M. S. Gorbachev, "Vital Creativity . . .," op. cit., loc. cit.
117. As early as late in 1981, according to information coming over Radio Budapest from Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute for the Economy of the Socialist World System in Moscow, an interministerial commission was set up to study economic experimentation in other socialist countries. (BBC, "Summary of World Broadcast," SU/7306/B/2 f.).
118. Cf. "26th CPSU Congress--CPSU Central Committee Status Report and the Next Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy," Berlin, 1981, p 11.
119. These were his Leningrad speech of 17 May 1985 and his Moscow speech of 11 June 1985 (cf. M. Boyse, "The East German Experience and Soviet Economic Reform Options," Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report/148, 23 December 1985, p 3). In his June speech he spoke about inter-industrial associations and said: "That is a highly promising matter as demonstrated by the experiences in the fraternal countries, first and foremost in the GDR." (BBC SWB, SU/7976/C/1 f.) The last phrase of that sentence is omitted in the book edition, Gorbachev, 1985, p 129.
120. Cf. McAdams, 1985, pp 58 f.
121. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 20 April 1986, p 5.
122. Ibid., 18 April 1986, p 4.
123. EINHEIT, 41/1986/4-5, p 307.
124. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 April 1986, p 3.
125. PRAVDA, 26 April 1986, p 1.
126. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 29 April 1986, p 2.
127. PRAVDA, 26 February 1986, p 8.
128. Cf. "Gorbachev Addressing the 10th PZPR Congress," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 1 July 1986, p 5.
129. Cf. Staritz, 1985, pp 192 ff; McAdams, 1985, pp 114 f.
130. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 April 1986, p 9.
131. Ibid., 18 April 1986, p 3.
132. Gorbachev addressing the SED party congress: "The resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress have met with broad positive response in the fraternal parties and countries, including the GDR. We are deeply grateful to you. Such a stance of joy and of joining the common cause strengthens us in the correctness of the course taken and inspires us." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 19 April 1986, p 3.

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5885
CSO: 2300/32

POLITICS

HUNGARY

PUBLIC OUTCRY HALTS IMPORT OF AUSTRIAN WASTE

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Jul 86 p 5

[Article by Sandor Ambrus: "Waste Import comes to an End, much to the Satisfaction of the People of Mosonmagyarovar."]

[Text] The growing amount of waste and its management is becoming a concern of increasing frequency the world over. For developed, industrial nations it is more cost effective to transport waste somewhere else, than to destroy it on the spot. Accordingly, it is no coincidence that nowadays it is fashionable in Western Europe to "export" waste or trash, if they can find enterprises or international trading companies willing to handle these peculiar transactions. In Hungary only one such "initiative" caused outrage among sober experts with foresight. Flexum Communal Enterprise, together with the involvement of Nikex Foreign Trade Company has reached an agreement with the Mulltrans firm of Graz, by which the residential and industrial waste of Graz and its vicinity would be transported to Hungary. The waste would be deposited in Mosonmagyarovar. They further agreed that in the years to come, some 60 thousand tons of treated residential waste, mixed to a large degree with sewage sludge, would also be deposited in Hungary.

The managers of the Hungarian firm knew that Hungary was in need of hard currency. No one should be apprehensive, they thought, because they had established the possibility of acquiring hard currency. They made some calculations, but finished the calculations a bit too early, at the half-way point. They went only so far as the calculations supported their decision. Using the hoped-for hard currency, they wanted to purchase machinery needed to sort and to treat even our domestic residential waste. In other words, they agreed to accept the trash from Graz without making certain that the preliminary conditions did indeed exist.

Arguments and Counter Arguments

There were clashing arguments and counter arguments. The storm mounted as the news spread: Mosonmagyarovar will be the "recipient" of trash from Graz. And so they began transporting waste even before the people of Mosonmagyarovar could have known of the hoped-for advantage: namely that Hungary would receive 20-25 million forints worth of foreign exchange. It is true that the shippers

paid 200 schillings per ton, but perhaps not quite that much, because Flexum agreed to accept the tons of waste together with the payment of freight and the cost of regular examinations. Nevertheless, insofar as Flexum is concerned, the 1985 waste import paid off. The waste kept coming pursuant to the agreement in force, while the experts argued. After shipment of 767 railroad cars filled with trash Flexum's gross income amounted to 11 million forints, of which 2.5 million was net profit. Out of the net profit, however, no one bothered to deduct the amount needed to mitigate the inherent environmental damage. According to some, the sludge used to enrich residential waste contained some hazardous and toxic materials as well as some heavy metals, (such as led, cadmium and zink,) in amounts that exceeded the permissible limits. Investigations to date have not revealed any irreversible damage, however.

A decision is being made!

As of today, the findings of the National Water Resource Office still stand: the city's water quality is good--no detectable contamination has reached the main water level. Contamination has, however, reached the smaller water levels. Armed with test results and expert opinions the OKTH and the EVM announced their position. Based on the investigations, and considering the interests of the various enterprises, the people's economy, environmental concerns and well as the rightful dissatisfaction of the city's inhabitants, it has been decided that by the beginning of the third quarter of this year, the import of waste must come to an end.

Accordingly, the import of trash will be discontinued. There were no violations of laws, because at the time Flexum Communal Enterprise entered into contract with the above mentioned Austrian firm, no permit was needed for the import of waste from the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development, from the Ministry of Health or from the National Office of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. Today, permits from these agencies would be needed. And so, the legal loophole has been closed! Having learned from the events, the OKTH has requested the Ministry on Foreign Trade to consistently observe official and other environmental regulations when issuing import permits.

And yet some more things had happened. Sponsored by the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development, the Geodetic Survey and Soil Analysis Enterprise has developed a method, by which Flexum Communal Enterprise must examine the imported waste. This is in addition to random sampling conducted by the Environmental Protection Institute, as required by the OKTH. The OKTH has also instructed its office in the northern part of the Trans-Danubian region to pursue increased surveillance. These actions are aimed at preventing the entry of hazardous waste into Hungary.

Members of the Environmental Protection unit of the Mosonmagyarovar City Preservation Association must also be satisfied: even though they travelled a bumpy road, ultimately their warnings yielded the desired results.

The events of Mosonmagyarovar that brought about a rather broadly based debate, also provide lessons of general applicability. The most notable lesson is that a community that is consistent, capable of reasoning, and

protective of its environment in a reasonable manner, may prevail, after all. For them it should be reassuring that in the years to come, sewage sludge, uncontrolled organic substances and hazardous heavy metals will not enter the abandoned mine shafts of Mosonmagyarovar.

Lessons for edification.

No one can tell what will happen hereafter to the waste produced by Graz and its vicinity. Most certainly, our neighbors will find a solution, but one thing is certain: the people of the County of Györ-Sopron cannot help in alleviating their concerns. They cannot help, because the proper storage of the County's own hazardous waste is yet unresolved. All of us can learn from the events at Mosonmagyarovar. In many parts of our country we struggle with the increasing storage and disposal problems of waste, often hazardous waste. The experience gained from this unique, one-time initiative remind us of things that must be attended at the home front.

12995

CSO: 2500/390

POLITICS

POLAND

BACKGROUND DETAILS OF JARUZELSKI BUDAPEST TV INTERVIEW

Budapest ORSZAG VIIAG in Hungarian 30 June 86 p 5

[Article by Tamas Alaksza: "The Background of an Interview"]

[Text] When--literally after many long years of preparation--Hungarian Television and Radio had an opportunity to broadcast a 30-minute conversation with Wojciech Jaruzelski, the editor of the "Face to Face" program, Alajos Chrudinak, immediately decided that in addition to an official announcement, there was also a need to give the human portrait of an exceptional politician.

Even Jaruzelski's biography is exceptional. He was 16 years old when the Second World War and Hitler's aggression took place. In 1939, together with his family, he ended up in a distant region of the Soviet Union, and that was where he joined the newly organized First Polish Army in 1943. This army became the nucleus of today's Polish People's Army; it fought Nazism on the side of the Soviet Union.

The conversation ran long past the planned program time, so the reporter's questions had to be abbreviated during the course of the interview. In spite of this, the first secretary of the PZPR, who is also the president of the Council of State, proved to be an understanding conversation partner. "You are the experts, you know how things should be done," he said when he noted, with a modicum of (un-revealed) surprise, that the television crew reorganized the room where the interview was to take place.

Even the location was significant: Instead of the luxurious Belvedere Palace, the program was recorded in the more modest building of the Council of Ministers. The general of the armies still spends most of his working hours there.

It was also somewhat out of the ordinary that he did not answer previously submitted written questions. Only the areas to be discussed were determined in advance by him and the television crew, but he visibly welcomed the idea of responding spontaneously: after all, during the most difficult days of the crisis, the new working style that is now known as the leadership style of the PZPR was characterized by the same directness, openness of communication, and cultivation of human contacts.

Nowadays the general wears civilian clothes; this is another sign of normalization. The Sejm chose him to be the head of government in February 1981. At the time, he stated his creed as a politician in the following way: "I continue to consider myself primarily a soldier, and I am always at the disposal of the Sejm, especially if my government does not fulfill expectations. Similarly, I will return my mandate as soon as this Honored Assembly feels that the goals placed before the government have been realized."

Since that time, having completed his mission, Jaruzelski returned his mandate to the National Assembly. Now, under much more relaxed circumstances, he talks with the Hungarian newsmen almost cheerfully, describing how during the time of martial law he frequently had only one or two hours' rest, did not get home for weeks at a time, and slept in his office on a narrow couch. But as he said, his background as a soldier prepared him for such trials. The period also brought great human tensions; the most difficult decision was the one concerning martial law--but the polarization of the country had to be prevented. As he emphasized, the extraordinary measures were not introduced to protect the negative phenomena of the past but the improvements of the future. And it was just then, during the first days of martial law, that the long-awaited and much-discussed economic reform was introduced, perhaps not at the best moment, since the Poland was under Western restrictions, but at an opportune time from the political point of view: The confidence of the people had to be regained.

"By now Poland's crisis is over," the first secretary of the PZPR stated. "The surface still shows its effects, but deep down there have taken place certain changes that will cure the national economy."

There was a question among the initial ones, that asked, how did the young officer with war-time experiences become a communist? And from here it was natural to turn to the decisions made during the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the tendencies of which remind one of the debates during the 9th and 10th congress of the PZPR. It was first secretary Mikhail Gorbachev who personally conveyed the friendship of Soviet communists. (During the recent 10th congress of the PZPR, foreign journalists also noticed the friendly rapport that had evidently developed between Mikhail Gorbachev and Wojciech Jaruzelski.)

The televised conversation also touched on the topic of the relationship between the Polish state and church. And it is worth mentioning that--even though Jaruzelski did not mention this, only alluded to it--this relationship is improving and becoming a partnership. The fact that--after 450 years--the Pope is not an Italian but a Pole lends new dimensions to the relationship between the Polish People's Republic and the Vatican. "The Pope is a committed Polish patriot," said the general. Based upon this conversation, it would not be surprising to see a re-establishment of the diplomatic relationship between the two states in the near future or the third visit by John Paul II to Poland.

Based in part on historical experiences, Hungary plays a special role in the fraternal relationships developed with the countries of the socialist community. In the course of conveying his good wishes to the Hungarian people, Jaruzelski specifically mentioned the experiences marked by the discretion and wisdom of Janos Kadar, and the cooperation between the two countries, not limited to an ideological-theoretical level but one which could produce mutual benefits in everyday economic practice.

The crew asked the general to remove his dark glasses so that the viewers could see him better on the screen. This was the only request with which he would not comply. The reason is simple: his eyes, tormented by wars, struggles and other tribulations, cannot tolerate strong light. Had he removed his glasses, it would have been impossible to produce what the conversation turned out to be: a friendly, unfettered conversation that went to the gist of the issues and made us forget time limitations.

12588

CSO: 2500/479

POLITICS

POLAND

PROPOSED SCHOOL COURSES MAY BE INTRODUCED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Aug 86 p 4

[Article by Jozsef K. Nyiro: "Poland: New School Courses--Uncertain at the Start of Academic Year"]

[Text] It now appears possible that, under the provisions of the school reform, Poland's high schools will introduce nine new subjects this September. We say "possible," because the situation concerning these issues is still rather fluid; no one knows how many schools will participate and what new subjects will be taught.

But let us look at the background. During the late 1970s the Ministry of Education proposed that school curricula should include certain subjects that would augment the general educational development of the students. Various scientific institutes began concrete curriculum design work after 1982. It was decided that the group of new subjects was to include the following: Introduction to Philosophy; Issues of Modern Civilization; Familiarity with Legal Affairs; Introduction to the Science of Economics; Problems of Pedagogy and Psychology; Environmental Protection and Transformation; Elements of Computer Science; Information Sciences, to include elements of the history of science; and finally, History of Religions.

The Polish research institute for curriculum sought to fulfill ambitious educational and pedagogical goals by introducing these subjects. "By becoming elements of a planned political education, the new subjects serve to transform several aspects of public thinking." Among the aspects to be thus changed, the institute referred to a certain voluntarism in studying and evaluating reality, the uncritical acceptance of social myths and cliches, and the prevalence of subjectivism.

Finally, in March the ministry issued guidelines concerning the organization of the 1986-1987 academic year, and--according to the POLITYKA of Warsaw--their decision was similar to the one made by King Solomon. While in the case of the basic subjects (Polish language, literature, history and mathematics) they decided in favor of accepting the reform in its entirety, on the other elective subjects they left the decision up to the schools. In other words, those schools that feel confident and ready to teach the subjects, can begin to teach all nine of them this September, while the less certain ones can wait

with this until next year. Decisions are to be made by the leadership and the faculty council of each school and approved by the education department of the local council.

In the final analysis, everyone is waiting to see, what will the new academic year bring?

12588

CSO: 2500/479

SOCIOLOGY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

THEOLOGIAN INTERVIEWED ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Amsterdam DE WAARHEID in Dutch 12 Sep 86 p 5

[Interview with Dr Heinrich Fink, dean of the Faculty of Theology at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, by Ad van Oosten, date and place not specified: "GDR Theologian Heinrich Fink on the Relationship Between Church and State--'Provocateurs Don't Get an Opportunity in the Church"'; first paragraph is DE WAARHEID introduction]

[Text] The church as a sanctuary for opposition in the GDR? That is the impression you might get from Heinrich Fink. He is the dean of the Theological Faculty at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. DE WAARHEID had a difficult talk with him about church, state, and independent groups in the GDR. "Our state is based on a scientific view of the world, not on an atheistic one."

Finally there are no pop songs like "Amore, Amore" resounding through the large hall of the exhibition "GDR, a Surprising Country." For the sake of a discussion between a theologian from a socialist country and a journalist from a very leftist newspaper, they have turned off the music in Amsterdam's Koopmansbeurs. The central question of the conversation: can we view the church in the GDR as a place where "divergent" thoughts can be expressed and lived out?

Professor Heinrich Fink begins to tell about his ties with the Netherlands, which date back to the 1950's. "The reunification of Germany was a question we couldn't talk about in those days with our West German brothers and sisters, but then we came into contact with Netherlands students. They didn't tell us what we should do in our situation, whereas the West Germans said, 'You have to do thus and so and above all you must be anticomunist.' We said, 'Communism isn't our problem.'"

"The state restored the separation with the church in 1945. The state would not meddle in church affairs and the church could carry out its task independently. That was the first measure taken by the Russian occupation forces."

[Question] Is the church not persecuted?

[Answer] Our state is based on a scientific view of the world, not on an atheistic one. The party will not encourage its members to go to church but it will see to it that its policy is not an atheistic one. Everybody is protected in his beliefs.

[Question] Things have been made difficult for the faithful, though, for instance in getting higher positions.

[Answer] Certainly there are people who haven't gotten high-ranking jobs because they didn't toe the state's line. That doesn't mean they were persecuted as Christians, simply that their political views were not recognized. The question isn't whether they were Christians but what their relationship was to the state. That's understandable too, because you have to be able to rely on your cadres. You look first for the people you can rely on.

Misuse

[Question] Can people with opinions different from those of the state organize themselves within the church?

[Answer] They cannot organize themselves within the church. The youth of the Evangelical (Protestant--Ad van Oosten) Church gathers in the church community and of course there are unbelievers there too. But anybody who wants to use the church for the wrong purposes and provocations, they're misusing the church. If they want to indoctrinate people, they don't get an opportunity.

[Question] We know that conscientious objectors ask the church for support.

[Answer] When people need help, the church must help, or when somebody wants to talk about problems. However, the church will help within the range of legal possibilities available in the GDR. If somebody wants to be a construction soldier (unarmed service in the army--Ad van Oosten), the church can tell him about the possibilities. Somebody who wants to refuse service completely, we can accompany him to prison. More the church cannot do. Because you're rejecting service in a state that itself does not want weapons. If the state is armed, than that's a necessary evil.

[Question] All states say that, I think. Bishop Schoenherr spoke out against all nuclear weapons, including those of the GDR. Do you agree with that?

[Answer] Not just I, our state does too. Erich Honecker said about the missiles, "These tools of the devil must go." Every tank is a tank too many and more armaments don't bring security. We're also speaking of our own weapons, believe me.

[Question] Fine, but I can imagine that somebody might draw conclusions that go farther than the state does.

[Answer] There's permanent discussion among us. In West Germany and the Netherlands I get the impression that people say, "We'll hold a happening and if nothing changes, well, we've had a happening." We say, "Our happening has to bring about change." That discussion is taking place inside the SED, in its various sections, and among citizens. Socialist democracy is built on that.

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